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Article 
Keeping Promises and Meeting Needs: 
Public Charities at a Crossroads 
Allison Anna Tait† 
The woods are lovely, dark and deep, 
But I have promises to keep, 
And miles to go before I sleep. 
–Robert Frost, Stopping by Woods on a Snowy Evening 
 
Nothing can have value without being an object of utility. 
–Karl Marx, Capital 
 
When a charitable organization cannot fulfill the terms of a 
charitable gift agreement, it must decide whether to keep a 
promise or meet a need. That is to say, a charitable organiza-
tion can either preserve original donor intent, adhering to con-
ditions placed on a gift, or it can attempt to modify the terms of 
the gift in order to budget and spend the funds more effectively. 
If an institution chooses to keep a promise, it might be stuck 
with a fund it cannot use because of conditions placed on the 
money at the time of the gift. In order to meet needs, however, 
the institution must go to court. Cy pres, the best tool available 
to such an organization, is a saving doctrine that allows courts 
to modify conditions placed on a charitable gift when the condi-
tions have become either impossible or impracticable.1 What it 
means, however, for a condition to be impracticable is unclear.2 
 
†  Assistant Professor, University of Richmond School of Law. My thanks 
to Robert Atkinson, Richard Brooks, Chris Cotropia, Susan Gary, Jim Gibson, 
Claudia Haupt, Meredith Harbach, Mary Heen, Michael Heller, Avery Katz, 
Corinna Lain, John Langbein, Shari Motro, Luke Norris, Robert Scott, and 
Robert Sitkoff. I also thank Erin Whelan and Blake Grady for their assistance. 
Copyright © 2018 by Allison Anna Tait. 
 1. Cy pres derives from Norman French and means “as near,” the full 
phrase being “cy pres comme possible,” or “as near as possible . . . . The fairly 
common usage, ‘si pray,’ seems to be a mixture of French and English pronun-
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Courts are aware of this problem. The Iowa Supreme 
Court, evaluating a cy pres claim, observed: “A review of the 
case law on impossibility and impracticability has led many to 
believe ‘no precise definition of the standard exists,’ and wheth-
er something has become impossible or impracticable is up to 
the ‘particular facts of each case.’”3 Likewise, a Washington, 
D.C. trial court judge wrote: “The [c]ourt has not found, and the 
parties have not identified, any case law in this jurisdiction 
that explicitly defines the term ‘impracticable’ in the cy pres 
context.”4 In addition, the judge remarked, there was “relative-
ly little case law on this issue in other jurisdictions.”5 
Scholarship has not provided clear answers, either. Some 
commentators have remarked that the standards for determin-
ing whether a trust’s terms are impractical are too high, pre-
cluding institutions from using restricted funds in ways that 
would benefit both the institution and the public.6 Other com-
 
ciation.” RONALD CHESTER ET AL., THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES ch. 22, 
§ 431 (3d ed. 2017). 
 2. Critics have, in fact, complained for years that the cy pres doctrine is 
both ambiguous and applied inconsistently by courts. Nancy A. McLaughlin, 
Rethinking the Perpetual Nature of Conservation Easements, 29 HARV. ENVTL. 
L. REV. 421, 465–66 (2005). A 1973 American Bar Association report found 
that there was “significant variance in the degree of impossibility or impracti-
cability required” by courts. Report of Committee on Charitable Trusts and 
Foundations, Cy Pres and Deviation: Current Trends in Application, 8 REAL 
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 391, 398–400 (1973). Thirty years later, not much has 
changed. In trust law, one scholar has remarked that, “no precise definition of 
the standard exists.” McLaughlin, supra at 437. For other explorations of cy 
pres, see John K. Eason, Motive, Duty, and the Management of Restricted 
Charitable Gifts, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 123 (2010); Susan N. Gary, Regu-
lating the Management of Charities: Trust Law, Corporate Law, and Tax Law, 
21 U. HAW. L. REV. 593 (1999); Iris J. Goodwin, Ask Not What Your Charity 
Can Do for You: Robertson v. Princeton Provides Liberal-Democratic Insights 
into the Dilemma of Cy Pres Reform, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 75, 123 (2009); and Alli-
son Tait, The Secret Economy of Charitable Giving, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1663 
(2015). 
 3. Kolb v. City of Storm Lake, 736 N.W.2d 546, 556 (Iowa 2007) (citing 
McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 465). The court concluded that cy pres was appli-
cable when a charitable trust created to build and maintain a fountain and 
garden at a certain location could no longer fulfill its terms after the city razed 
the garden in order to make room for a major economic development project. 
“Such a massive project should be planned in a way that maximizes its poten-
tial, and when the location of the garden and fountain jeopardize that poten-
tial it becomes impractical not to relocate them.” Id. at 557. 
 4. Trs. of the Corcoran Gallery of Art v. District of Columbia, 142 Daily 
Wash. L. Rptr. 2213, 2218 (D.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 18, 2014). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Some scholars believe that the reform efforts have not been sufficient 
to modernize an outdated doctrine. See, e.g., Rob Atkinson, The Low Road to 
 2018] KEEPING PROMISES 1791 
 
mentators have stated the opposite. These commentators la-
ment a perceived judicial trend to relax the conventional 
standard, observing that “policy considerations and concern for 
furthering the public welfare [have become] of increasing im-
portance in delimiting and defining the degree and type of im-
practicality necessary to call the cy pres doctrine into opera-
tion.”7 Neither clarity nor consensus on how courts analyze 
impracticability exists.8 
That there is no clear standard or consensus is no small 
problem. The stakes are high, both in terms of dollars spent in 
charitable giving, as well as the health of charitable institu-
tions. Americans gave $389.05 billion to charitable institutions 
in 2016.9 In addition, it is estimated that by the year 2061 some 
fifty-eight trillion dollars will transfer between generations.10 
To be sure, not all gifts come with restrictions. But the ones 
that do are generally major gifts—the ones that provide the 
most significant resources to an institution. When donors re-
strict these gifts, they also restrict institutional flexibility be-
cause recipient institutions are obligated to adhere to such 
terms—even if they become outdated or burdensome. Taken to 
the extreme, gift restrictions may lead to inappropriate forms of 
 
Cy Pres Reform: Principled Practice To Remove Dead Hand Control of Chari-
table Assets, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 97, 97 (2007) [hereinafter Atkinson, The 
Low Road] (stating that calls for reform, “for all their merit, have gone virtual-
ly unheeded”); see also Rob Atkinson, Reforming Cy Pres Reform, 44 HASTINGS 
L.J. 1111, 1114 (1993) (proposing that charities control charitable assets ra-
ther than subjecting gifts to either donor control or state-imposed modifica-
tion). See generally C. Ronald Chester, Cy Pres: A Promise Unfulfilled, 54 IND. 
L.J. 407, 414 (1979) (describing the historical development of cy pres and at-
tempts to reform the doctrine). Vocal critics of reform also exist. See Chris Ab-
binante, Comment, Protecting “Donor Intent” in Charitable Foundations: 
Wayward Trusteeship and the Barnes Foundation, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 665 
(1997). For a comparative perspective, see Peter Luxton, Cy-Pres and the 
Ghost of Things That Might Have Been, 47 CONV. & PROP. LAW. 107 (1983). 
 7. EDITH L. FISCH, THE CY PRES DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED STATES ch. 5, 
§ 5.02(b) (Matthew Bender & Co. ed., 1950). 
 8. See, e.g., Eason, supra note 2, at 125–26 (“[T]he malleability of cy pres 
doctrine too often leads to outcomes that fail to predictably serve either donor 
intentions or society’s interest in the accomplishment of purposes beneficial to 
the public.”). 
 9. Charitable Giving Statistics, NAT’L PHILANTHROPIC TR., http://www 
.nptrust.org/philanthropic-resources/charitable-giving-statistics (last visited 
Apr. 12, 2018). This reflects a 4.2% increase from 2015. Id. 
 10. JOHN J. HAVENS & PAUL G. SCHERVISH, A GOLDEN AGE OF PHILAN-
THROPY STILL BECKONS: NATIONAL WEALTH TRANSFER AND POTENTIAL FOR 
PHILANTHROPY TECHNICAL REPORT 5 (2014), https://www.bc.edu/content/dam/ 
files/research_sites/cwp/pdf/A%20Golden%20Age%20of%20Philanthropy%20 
Still%20Bekons.pdf. 
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“donor governance,”11 where donor control based on gift re-
strictions—often exerted from beyond the grave—supplants the 
rightful exercise of discretion by the institutional fiduciaries.12 
An unclear cy pres standard endangers both the financial 
health and the leadership authority of public charities. 
The time has come to articulate a clear and usable cy pres 
standard. The tools to do so are within reach, contained in the 
bodies of contract and property law. The turn to these bodies of 
law is apt, because trust law has roots in both contract and 
property. In fact, a longstanding debate—what some have even 
called a “hoary old debate”13—exists about whether trust law is 
contract or property.14 Both contract and property have some-
thing to offer to trust law and each body of law provides an im-
portant key to unlocking the cy pres conundrum. 
Contract informs trust law’s rules about keeping promises. 
A guiding principle for both contract and trust law is Pacta 
sunt servanda (promises must be kept).15 Trusts, like contracts, 
center on relationships, agreements, and intraparty obliga-
tions. Legal historians have therefore observed that “the dis-
tinction between trusts and contracts has not always been easi-
ly drawn.”16 John Langbein, in The Contractarian Basis of the 
Law of Trusts, has further explained the similarities between 
trust and contract law, particularly in the modern context of fi-
duciary duty and institutional trusteeship. Langbein states: 
 
 11. David Yermack, Donor Governance and Financial Management in 
Prominent U.S. Art Museums 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Pa-
per No. 21066, Apr. 2015), http://www.nber.org/papers/w21066.pdf (“Restricted 
donations represent a form of corporate governance, because they constrain 
the opportunities for non-profit managers to expropriate resources. I call this 
practice ‘donor governance,’ and it permits benefactors to influence a non-
profit for decades, even after they may have severed all connections or died.”). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law: A Com-
parative Legal and Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 434, 471 (1998). 
 14. See id.; John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of 
Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 627 (1995); Robert Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory 
of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 621, 628–31 (2004). 
 15. JOHN H. LANGBEIN, RENEE LETTOW LERNER & BRUCE P. SMITH, HIS-
TORY OF THE COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL 
INSTITUTIONS 311 (2009) (“Almost all cases in Chancery can be reduced to this 
simple formula, and the answer of conscience was as simple: promises have to 
be kept—pacta sunt servanda . . . .” (citing Franz Metzger, The Last Phase of 
the Medieval Chancery, in LAW-MAKING AND LAW-MAKERS IN BRITISH HISTO-
RY 79, 84 (Alan Harding ed., 1980))). 
 16. Neil G. Jones, Aspects of Privity in England: Equity to 1680, in IUS 
QUAESITUM TERTIO 135, 162 (Eltjo J.H. Schrage ed., 2008). 
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“[T]he deal between settlor and trustee is functionally indistin-
guishable from the modern third-party-beneficiary contract.”17 
The result: “Trusts are contracts.”18 
But trust law is also property law. In fact, “[w]e are accus-
tomed to think of the trust as a branch of property law.”19 This 
connection between trust and property has persisted because, 
while the relationship may contain a contract between trustee 
and settlor, a trust cannot be formed without property—an as-
set to be held and managed in trust. For this reason, the Re-
statement (Second) of Trusts said: “The creation of a trust is 
conceived of as a conveyance of the beneficial interest in the 
trust property rather than as a contract.”20 Property and trust 
both focus on the thing, or res, in trust, as well as its protection 
and efficient use. From property law, trust law inherits a set of 
rules and concerns about maximizing the value and the utility 
of a managed asset. Property rules are about productive use, 
obtaining a reasonable return, and meeting needs. 
This Article draws on both contract and property theory in 
order to enable a better understanding of trust law and what 
the standard for impracticability should be. Part I briefly de-
scribes the history and current status of cy pres in trust law. I 
offer three cy pres case studies that demonstrate how trust law 
is caught between contract and property, lacking guidance on 
how to identify and deploy various practical factors, doctrinal 
directives, and theoretical concepts. Part II begins with an ex-
ploration of the historical connections between trust, contract, 
and property, uncovering the conceptual ties between the bod-
ies of law. I then analyze contract and property doctrines that 
bear on trust law’s impracticability question. I focus first on 
commercial impracticability cases that demonstrate contract 
law’s high premium on both keeping promises and bargaining. I 
then explore property law rules—easements by necessity and 
variances—to reveal the premium the rules place on efficient 
use of property and the notion of reasonable return. In Part III, 
I propose a revised standard for cy pres impracticability, draw-
ing on both contract and property law, and explain why a new 
hybrid rule is theoretically apposite. 
 
 17. Langbein, supra note 14, at 627 (1995). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 197 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 
1959). 
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Ultimately, both contract and property can help craft a cy 
pres doctrine that balances institutional obligation and need, 
while the inquiry into contract and property provides a new 
and helpful aperture through which to better assess the nature 
of trust law itself. 
I.  DILEMMAS IN THE CHARITABLE SECTOR   
Historically, courts have used cy pres to modify gift condi-
tions and trust terms when the purpose becomes obsolete or ex-
ceedingly outdated.21 Cy pres modifications remedy value-
impairing conditions placed on gifts, correct inefficiencies and 
complications associated with dead-hand control, and recali-
brate the equilibrium between donor control and public bene-
fit.22 Broadly construed, cy pres is a delicate balancing act be-
tween keeping promises and using property efficiently. In this 
way, the cy pres doctrine is also a balancing act between the 
normative goals of contract and property. In this Part, I provide 
an overview of the cy pres doctrine prior to analyzing three re-
cent cases that demonstrate how nonprofit institutions can be 
handicapped by unclear trust standards of impracticability. 
A. TRUST LAW AND THE CY PRES DOCTRINE 
According to the cy pres doctrine, a court can modify the 
terms of a charitable trust or restricted charitable gift (the doc-
trine does not apply to private trusts23) if the trust terms have 
become impossible to achieve or impracticable to perform.24 The 
Uniform Trust Code (UTC) adds that “the doctrines of cy pres 
 
 21. Tait, supra note 2, at 1681. 
 22. For example, one court modified gift terms on a fund that provided a 
baked potato at each meal for each young woman at Bryn Mawr College. Jul-
ius Rosenwald, Principles of Public Giving, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May 1929, at 
601. 
 23. Private trusts can be changed using the Claflin doctrine or adminis-
trative/equitable deviation. See JESSE DUKEMINIER, JAMES LINDGRIN, & ROB-
ERT H. SITKOFF, WILL, TRUSTS & ESTATES 759–60 (10th ed.). 
 24. Cy pres may also be judicially applied when the terms are unlawful or 
wasteful. Drafters of the UTC added the category of wasteful in 2000 and 
wasteful entered into the Restatement (Third) of Trusts in 2003. The Re-
statement defines wasteful as meaning that the funds far exceed what is nec-
essary, rendering it imprudent not to expand the purposes for which the funds 
can be applied. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 (AM. LAW INST. 2003). I 
discuss impracticability (and impossibility, to a lesser degree) and not waste-
fulness because of the similarities that exist between cy pres impracticability 
and doctrines in both contract and property law. I therefore set aside the ques-
tion of wastefulness for another venue and time. 
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and deviation apply to funds held by nonprofit corporations as 
well as to funds held by charitable trusts.”25 Similarly, the Uni-
form Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act 
(UPMIFA) permits the use of cy pres as a tool for modifying re-
strictions placed on any nonprofit institutional funds.26 Cy 
pres, therefore, has a wide reach and potential application for 
any nonprofit organization that holds restricted funds, includ-
ing major universities, hospitals, and museums. 
To begin the cy pres process, the trustees or directors of a 
charitable institution must file a petition seeking judicial modi-
fication. Generally, the fiduciaries and parties with a special 
interest are the only ones with standing to seek such modifica-
tions.27 The general rule, relayed for example in UPMIFA, is 
that the trustees or directors also “shall notify the [Attorney 
General] of the application, and the [Attorney General] must be 
given an opportunity to be heard.”28 Once the petition has been 
filed, courts apply a multipart test to evaluate whether cy pres 
is appropriate. In the absence of contravening language in the 
trust itself, courts must determine that (1) a valid charitable 
trust exists; and (2) the trust’s purpose is illegal, impractical, 
 
 25. UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT prefatory note 
at 4 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2006). The comment to UTC section 413 states that: 
“The doctrine of cy pres is applied not only to trusts, but also to other types of 
charitable dispositions, including those to charitable corporations.” UNIF. TR. 
CODE § 413 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010). 
 26. UPMIFA section 6(c) states:  
If a particular charitable purpose or a restriction contained in a gift 
instrument on the use of an institutional fund becomes unlawful, im-
practicable, impossible to achieve, or wasteful, the court, upon appli-
cation of an institution, may modify the purpose of the fund or the re-
striction on the use of the fund in a manner consistent with the 
charitable purposes expressed in the gift instrument. 
UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 6(c) (UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N 2006). Forty-nine states as well as the District of Columbia and the 
U.S. Virgin Islands have adopted the UPMIFA as of 2018. Legislative Fact 
Sheet—Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Prudent%20 
Management%20of%20Institutional%20Funds%20Act (last visited Apr. 12, 
2018). UPMIFA applies primarily to funds held by charities organized as non-
profit corporations. UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT 1 
prefatory note (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2006). 
 27. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 23, at 782 (discussing the problem of 
standing with respect to the enforcement of charitable trusts); see also Evelyn 
Brody, From the Dead Hand to the Living Dead: The Conundrum of Charita-
ble-Donor Standing, 41 GA. L. REV. 1183, 1197–1206 (2007) (detailing which 
parties have standing under common law charitable trust doctrine). 
 28. UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 6(c) (UNIF. 
LAW COMM’N 2006). 
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impossible, or wasteful.29 If these conditions are met, the court 
has the power to modify the terms of the trust, as long as the 
modifications are in alignment with the donor’s original intent. 
The common law doctrine provides “that equity will . . . substi-
tute another charitable object which is believed to approach the 
original purpose as closely as possible.”30 The UTC has softened 
this requirement somewhat, stating that the court may apply 
cy pres by directing that the trust property “be applied or dis-
tributed, in whole or in part, in a manner consistent with the 
settlor’s charitable purposes.”31 
A dispositive question, then, for proceeding to cy pres anal-
ysis is whether gift terms are either impossible or impractica-
ble. Courts have not clearly differentiated between impractica-
bility and impossibility. Pressed to articulate a difference, 
courts have traditionally interpreted impossible quite literally, 
meaning that the object of funding has ceased to exist. For ex-
ample, a gift dedicated to curing polio is faced with an impossi-
ble application of funds because the disease has been eliminat-
ed. A gift to an institution that subsequently merges with 
another one or otherwise ceases to exist in its original form is 
 
 29. The current version of the UTC presumes general charitable intent, 
unlike the previous versions. In states that have not adopted the UTC, fiduci-
aries also have to prove that the donor had general charitable intent. See 
UNIF. TR. CODE § 413 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010) (“Subsection (a), which is sim-
ilar to Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 67 . . . modifies the doctrine of cy pres 
by presuming that the settlor had a general charitable intent when a particu-
lar charitable purpose becomes impossible or impracticable to achieve. Tradi-
tional doctrine did not supply that presumption, leaving it to the courts to de-
termine whether the settlor had a general charitable intent.”); RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 (AM. LAW INST. 2003). This formulation has been 
widely adopted by courts as well. See, e.g., Kolb v. City of Storm Lake, 
736 N.W.2d 546, 555 (Iowa 2007). 
 30. RONALD CHESTER ET AL., THE LAW OF TRUSTS & TRUSTEES ch. 22, 
§ 431 (3d ed. 2017) (emphasis added). 
 31. UNIF. TR. CODE § 413 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010) (emphasis added). A 
comment to section 67 of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts states that the 
modified purpose “need not be the nearest possible but one reasonably similar 
or close to the settlor ’s designated purpose.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS 
§ 67 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 2003). This relaxes the previous standard, which 
was that courts must generally seek a purpose that conforms to the donor ’s 
objective “as nearly as possible.” In re Elizabeth J.K.L. Lucas Charitable Gift, 
261 P.3d 800, 809 (Haw. Ct. App. 2011) (citing 15 AM. JUR. 2D Charities § 157 
(2011)). UPMIFA section 6(c) states that the proposed modification be “in a 
manner consistent with the charitable purposes expressed in the gift instru-
ment.” UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 6(c) (UNIF. 
LAW COMM’N 2006). 
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similarly impossible to administer.32 In a recent New York 
case, the court found a gift to a hospital that had “ceased oper-
ating as a hospital, modified its corporate name and changed 
its corporate function to promoting health and well-being” was 
subject to cy pres modification because circumstances rendered 
the gift terms impossible to satisfy as written.33 This standard 
of impossibility is embodied in some state statutes, such as 
Rhode Island’s, which provides, in relevant part, that 
“[a]pplication of the cy pres doctrine, under Rhode Island law, 
is limited to circumstances where the purposes of a donor can-
not be literally carried into effect.”34 Impossibility, therefore, 
generally provides “relief only on a narrow set of grounds,”35 in 
the face of changed circumstances that bring about a clear frus-
tration of the original purpose. 
The standard for impracticability is less extreme and also 
less clear. The Restatement (Third) of Trusts states that “[t]he 
doctrine of cy pres may also be applied, even though it is possi-
ble to carry out the particular purpose of the settlor, if to do so 
would not accomplish the settlor’s charitable objective, or 
would not do so in a reasonable way.”36 The impracticability 
standard, therefore, recognizes and acknowledges that circum-
stances may arise in which the trust terms cannot be carried 
out without substantial burden to the institution or substantial 
impairment of the charitable purpose.37 In practice, however, 
this standard does not always provide sufficient clarity for 
courts trying to determine what kinds of conditions unduly 
burden institutions and impair donor intent.  
 
 32. Cf. Goodwin, supra note 2, at 101–02 (“The cy pres doctrine harbors no 
criterion by which to evaluate the continued social efficacy of a nondiscrimina-
tory restricted gift short of showing that its object ceased to exist.”). 
 33. In re Lally, 112 A.D.3d 1099, 1101 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013). The court 
reformed the terms of the trust and directed the funds to the institution that 
“assumed all responsibility for the hospital and related healthcare services 
previously provided by [the former hospital].” Id. 
 34. 18 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 18-4-1 (1956). 
 35. Goodwin, supra note 2, at 101. 
 36. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2003). 
 37. 15 AM. JUR. 2D § 151 (2011) (citing insufficiency of funds as one reason 
why it may be difficult to accomplish the charitable purpose of a gift); Mark 
Dennison, Circumstances Warranting Application of Cy Pres Doctrine To Mod-
ify Terms of Charitable Trust, in 88 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts 469, 496 § 10 
(2006) (“A purpose becomes impracticable when the application of [trust] prop-
erty to such purpose would not accomplish the general charitable intention of 
the settlor.”). 
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A Hawaiian state appellate court decision, In re Elizabeth 
J.K.L. Lucas Charitable Gift,38 exemplifies a relatively broad 
judicial interpretation of the impracticability standard. In that 
case, the donor gifted interest in a parcel of land to the Hawai-
ian Humane Society, with the restriction that the property “be 
used for the benefit of the public for the operation of an educa-
tional preserve for flora and fauna.”39 The Humane Society 
made “numerous attempts” to use the land within the parame-
ters established by the gift deed.40 However, the State of Ha-
waii determined that the land was mostly unsuitable for use as 
a public park41 and all possible plans were ultimately rejected 
as “physically or economically unfeasible.”42 The Humane Soci-
ety finally brokered a deal to exchange one small, usable part of 
the land to the State and to sell the rest to a private partner-
ship.43 The funds would be put toward environmental steward-
ship programming.44 The appellate court concluded that cy pres 
was applicable “where a settlor creates a charitable trust of re-
al property to be used for a particular purpose, but the property 
turns out to be unsuitable for that purpose.”45 
Impracticability represents a lower threshold than impos-
sibility—compliance is not technically impossible but, rather, 
impossible without the recipient institution taking on an exces-
sive burden. Impracticability combines notions of the unworka-
ble, the inefficient, and the unaffordable. There is no consistent 
standard, however, for what constitutes hardship or excessive 
 
 38. 261 P.3d 800, 807 (Haw. Ct. App. 2011). 
 39. Id. at 803. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 812. 
 42. Id. at 803. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 804. In order to effectuate the deal, the Humane Society filed a 
petition with the probate court, requesting a modification of the gift terms. Id. 
The probate court concluded that the gift terms were not capable of being mod-
ified through the use of cy pres because an alternative use had been identified 
in the gift deed. Id. at 805. 
 45. Id. at 807 (citing Roberds v. Markham, 81 F. Supp. 38, 40 (D.D.C. 
1948)) (recognizing that courts may order sale of gifted land if conditions have 
drastically changed or land otherwise becomes unsuitable for its dedicated 
purpose); see Bd. of Educ. v. City of Rockford, 24 N.E.2d 366, 369–73 (Ill. 1939) 
(applying cy pres to allow sale of land in charitable trust where its dedicated 
use as school became impracticable due to shifting populations, deterioration 
of existing building, and existence of another school that met needs of the ar-
ea); AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF 
TRUSTS § 39.5.2, at 2724–25 (4th ed. 1988). 
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burden, and courts are left to speculate while public charities 
try to navigate troubled financial waters. 
B. CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS IN DISTRESS 
Recent cy pres cases confirm that the cy pres standard is 
inconsistent and hard to pin down. In this Section, I discuss 
three cases and explore how doctrinal inconsistency may be 
harming charitable organizations more than it is helping. In 
certain cases, like the Corcoran Gallery case, a good result for 
the institution ensues and the institution benefits from new 
forms of flexibility. In other cases, such as the Girard College 
and Sweet Briar cases, cy pres may not be available to the in-
stitution and there is, consequently, no clear path out of finan-
cial difficulties. 
1. The Corcoran Gallery: The Desperation Standard 
One of the most recent and highly publicized cy pres cases 
involved the closing of the Corcoran Gallery, and the takeover 
of its assets and functions by the National Gallery of Art (NGA) 
and the George Washington University (GWU). The case, The 
Trustees of the Corcoran Gallery of Art v. District of Colum-
bia,46 turned on questions of financial hardship and the possi-
bilities available to the Corcoran Gallery for raising money. 
The Corcoran was established in 1869 through a deed of 
trust executed by William Wilson Corcoran.47 The goal of the 
trust was to fund an institution in Washington D.C. that was 
“dedicated to Art, and used solely for the purpose of encourag-
ing American Genius.”48 The deed of trust also created a board 
of trustees and vested them with general management authori-
ty of the institution.49 In the following decade, the trustees es-
tablished Corcoran College, “which was integrated into the 
overall institution and which emphasized student access to the 
art collection.”50 
A little over a century after the Corcoran was created, 
however, the institution’s financial condition began to deterio-
rate.51 The court found that, since 2001, the Corcoran had ex-
 
 46. Trs. of the Corcoran Gallery of Art v. District of Columbia, 142 Daily 
Wash. L. Rptr. 2213 (D.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 18, 2014). 
 47. Id. at 2214. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 2215. 
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perienced significant budget problems and had “been operating 
at a deficit for . . . the majority of the last thirteen years.”52 The 
Corcoran was struggling to make payments on loans that were 
in default and to meet even basic payroll obligations.53 Fur-
thermore, even though the Corcoran had net assets of more 
than seventy-three million dollars, only four million dollars of 
these assets were unrestricted, giving the trustees little flexi-
bility within the budget to cover emergency expenses or reor-
ganize spending.54 
In an attempt to decrease operating expenses, the Trustees had voted 
to decrease staff and had deferred necessary building maintenance.55 
Deferred maintenance, however, raised questions about the building’s 
capacity to house the art as well as the College.56 A report from con-
sultants stated that the building’s old systems were “not capable of 
reliably maintaining museum-level exhibit and conservation stand-
ards.”57 
Seeking a way out of this financial distress, the trustees 
filed a cy pres petition,58 requesting that the court permit the 
Corcoran to be subsumed jointly into GWU and the NGA. GWU 
would establish a new school for art and design, incorporating 
the Corcoran College students into this new school. The NGA 
would acquire the bulk of the artwork and establish a “new 
contemporary art program, incorporating the Corcoran 
name.”59 The threshold question before the court was whether 
the trustees had “established that it [was] impracticable to car-
 
 52. Id. at 2220. 
 53. Id. at 2215. 
 54. Id. at 2221. 
 55. Id. at 2215. 
 56. Id. at 2221. 
 57. Id. Because of these problems, the college’s accreditation was at stake. 
Id. at 2215. The commission charged with reaccreditation reported that: “The 
College lacks the resources to operate much beyond the next academic 
year . . . . Most of our negative evaluation judgments are about standards that 
are directly affected by dwindling resources.” Id. 
 58. See D.C. CODE § 19-1304.13 (2004) (“Except as otherwise provided in 
the terms of the trust, if a particular charitable purpose is or becomes unlaw-
ful, impracticable, impossible to achieve, or wasteful: (1) The trust does not 
fail, in whole or in part; (2) The trust property does not revert to the settlor or 
the settlor ’s successors in interest; and (3) The court may apply cy pres to 
modify or terminate the trust by directing that the trust property be applied or 
distributed, in whole or in part, in a manner consistent with the settlor ’s char-
itable purposes.”). 
 59. Trs. of the Corcoran Gallery of Art v. District of Columbia, 142 Daily 
Wash. L. Rptr. 2213 (D.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 18, 2014). 
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ry out the [d]eed of [t]rust that created the Corcoran given the 
Corcoran’s current financial condition.”60 
Regarding the question of impracticability, the court could 
find no relevant cy pres case law, in its own jurisdiction or 
elsewhere.61 The court added that the legislative history of the 
Uniform Trust Act “does not elucidate this issue.”62 Because of 
this relative lack of guidance, the court turned to contract law 
and commercial impracticability to gain new insights: 
In the contract context, the Court of Appeals has defined “impractica-
ble” to mean that a party is excused from performing its obligations 
under a contract due to an unexpected contingency only if that con-
tingency causes the party “extreme or unreasonable difficulty” in per-
forming its obligations under the contract, and not if the contingency 
is “a mere inconvenience or unexpected difficulty.”63 
The court concluded that “a party seeking cy pres relief can 
establish impracticability only if it demonstrates that it would 
be unreasonably difficult, and that it is not viable or feasible, to 
carry out the current terms and conditions of the trust.”64 
A group called Save the Corcoran, intervening to block the 
cy pres petition, argued that the Corcoran could raise funds 
through a major deaccessioning effort, as well as increased 
fundraising.65 The intervenors proposed that the Corcoran sell 
more than 17,000 pieces from the collection, and that the funds 
from these sales could bridge the budgetary gap.66 The court, 
however, found compelling evidence that the Corcoran would 
face sanctions from the American Association of Museum Di-
rectors (AAMD) if deaccessioning money were to be spent on 
 
 60. Id. at 2213. The second question was, if impracticable, whether “the 
plan proposed by the Trustees [is] as near as possible to the intent of William 
Wilson Corcoran when he established the Trust.” Id. I discuss the first ques-
tion here, and the question of donor intent is addressed in the following sec-
tion. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 61. Id. at 2218 (noting that neither the court nor the parties have identi-
fied case law explicitly defining impracticable in the court’s jurisdiction and 
little case law exists in other jurisdictions on the issue). The court did find 
that “the D.C. Circuit has noted that a party fails to establish impossibility or 
impracticability when it seeks to modify a charitable trust ‘merely because it 
suits its own convenience to do so.’” Id. (quoting Conn. Coll. v. United States, 
276 F.2d 491, 499 (D.C. Cir. 1960)). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. (quoting Island Dev. Corp. v. District of Columbia, 933 A.2d 340, 
350 (D.C. 2007)). 
 64. Id. at 2219. 
 65. Id. at 2221 (“Intervenors have argued that the Corcoran can address 
this shortfall of funds both by selling some of the more than 17,000 pieces in 
the Corcoran’s collection and by increasing its fundraising efforts.”). 
 66. Id. 
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operating costs.67 These sanctions, the court observed, could be 
“painful” and produce “substantial risks” for the institution, be-
cause the gallery would not be able to host traveling exhibitions 
or receive loans from other AAMD accredited museums.68 Sanc-
tions, including loss of accreditation, would also make it diffi-
cult for the Corcoran to retain high-quality curatorial staff and 
could disqualify the gallery from receiving federal grants and 
other funds.69  
The intervenors argued that a new fundraising program 
could bring the Corcoran back to financial health and stabil-
ity.70 The court was equally skeptical of this proposition. In-
deed, the court noted that even the intervenor’s own witnesses 
acknowledged that “fundraising campaigns take significant 
time to plan and execute” and that the planning period alone 
for a capital campaign was several years, followed by the multi-
year campaign.71 The court mentioned that, in the past, “the 
Corcoran’s fundraising department has been plagued by vacan-
cies and high staff turnover” that would make the job of build-
ing a top-rate board difficult.72 The court also remarked that 
global recession had made fundraising difficult even in the best 
of circumstances.73 
Crediting a report that stated the Corcoran board was 
“working tirelessly . . . to come to terms with the institution’s 
significant financial challenges and to identify creative solu-
tions,”74 the court concluded that the trustees had not only es-
tablished their own good faith, but also that the Corcoran’s cir-
cumstances were indeed impracticable. Severe financial 
distress combined with a paucity of plausible alternatives per-
suaded the court that the hardship was sufficiently severe to 
merit cy pres application.75 Consequently, the result was a good 
 
 67. Id. (discussing the possibility of sanctions). 
 68. Id. at 2221–22. For more on the regulation of deaccessioning, and the 
problems with the current framework, see Allison Tait, Publicity Rules for 
Public Trusts, 33 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 421 (2015). 
 69. Trs. of the Corcoran Gallery of Art v. District of Columbia, 142 Daily 
Wash. L. Rptr. 2213, 2215 (D.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 18, 2014). 
 70. Id. at 2221. 
 71. Id. The fundraising consultants proposed increasing donations 
through “better ‘Board-building’ practices,” which the court found speculative 
at best. Id. 
 72. Id. at 2222. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id.  
 75. See id. at 2215–23 (discussing the court’s reasoning for finding the 
“first requirement for cy pres relief ” was met). 
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one for the Corcoran, releasing it from the strictures imposed 
by the original deed of trust. Nevertheless, the bar the court es-
tablished for relief was a high one—the threat of institutional 
failure and financial insolvency. Had the Corcoran Gallery not 
been facing imminent failure and shuttering, it is not clear that 
the court would have reached the same decision. 
2. Girard College: Is the Hardship Permanent? 
Following the Corcoran case, the question of hardship 
arose again in In re Estate of Girard, requiring a Pennsylvania 
court to press further into what constitutes a sufficient showing 
of need. The case was not as clear-cut as it was with the Corco-
ran and, consequently, the court was not as sympathetic to the 
plaintiff institution. 
The Girard will—called by the trial court the “most litigat-
ed will in history”76—memorialized the last wishes of Stephen 
Girard. In this will, Girard left the majority of his “considerable 
estate” to be used to educate the poor and improve their cir-
cumstances: “I am particularly desirous to provide for such a 
number of poor male white orphan children, as can be trained 
in one institution, a better education, as well as a more com-
fortable maintenance, than they usually receive from the appli-
cation of public funds.”77 The will stipulated that these needy 
students be “fed . . . clothed . . . and lodged in a plain but safe 
manner.”78 
Over the years, Girard College fiduciaries had successfully 
sought judicial permission for various deviations, including the 
admission of women, students of color, and children with one 
living parent.79 In 2013, however, the Girard College Board of 
Directors (Girard College Board) sought permission to deviate 
from the terms of the will by eliminating the boarding function 
 
 76. Orphans’ Ct. Op. Sur Decree, Aug. 21, 2014 (Orphans’ Ct. Op.) at 1, 
https://z.umn.edu/OrphansCtDecree (quoting Hershel Shanks, State Action 
and the Girard Estate Case, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 213 (1956)). The will was the 
subject of multiple cases, starting as early as 1844. In fact, the 1844 case of 
Vidal v. Girard’s Executors was the case that established the validity of the 
charitable trust in American law. See Vidal v. Girard’s Ex’rs, 43 U.S. 127, 196 
(1844). For a discussion of the case, see Robert A. Ferguson, The Girard Will 
Case: Charity and Inheritance in the City of Brotherly Love, in PHILANTHROPY 
AND AMERICAN SOCIETY: SELECTED PAPERS 1 (Jack Salzman ed., 1987). 
 77. In re Estate of Girard, 132 A.3d 623, 625 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2016). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Orphans’ Ct. Op. Sur Decree, Aug. 21, 2014 (Orphans’ Ct. Op.) at 17, 
https://z.umn.edu/OrphansCtDecree. 
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because of financial hardship.80 The college’s funding derived 
from coal revenue, rental income, and interest on a residuary 
fund.81 The Girard College Board alleged that there had been a 
decrease in revenue produced from all these sources due to the 
economic crisis of 2008.82 The Girard College Board stated that 
the available income was “insufficient to fund the financial re-
quirements of the college, requiring shortfalls to be funded by 
the use of Trust principal.”83 Moreover, the Girard College 
Board claimed that, in the absence of change, the residuary 
fund “would be exhausted within 25 years.”84 
Like the Corcoran trustees, the Girard College Board de-
tailed the steps it had taken to address the budget shortfalls. 
The Girard College Board stated it had “significantly reduced 
expenses” by reducing the student population, and had reduced 
the college’s debt through refinancing.85 Furthermore, the 
Girard College Board had decided to defer certain maintenance 
repairs, including “$3.8 million for deficiency repairs and in ex-
cess of $110 million for complete renovations.”86 In an effort to 
cut costs, the Girard College Board also “froze raises and the 
defined benefit retirement plan for administrative employ-
ees.”87 
The Girard College Board created a strategic steering 
committee to review proposals for long-term solutions to the 
college’s financial problems.88 The steering committee’s recom-
mendation was that the residential program was too costly and 
that it should be suspended, at least temporarily, “given the fi-
nancial limitations and conditions of the physical plant.”89 The 
college could then focus on a nonresidential program for grades 
one through eight, consolidating those grades into the lower 
school building, which would still require four million dollars in 
 
 80. The Girard College Board sought to make these changes via both ad-
ministrative deviation and cy pres. See In re Estate of Girard, 132 A.3d at 631 
(listing the issues raised by the Girard College Board). 
 81. Id. at 626. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 625. 
 84. Id. at 626. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 626–27 (internal quotations omitted). 
 87. Orphans’ Ct. Op. Sur Decree, Aug. 21, 2014 (Orphans’ Ct. Op.) at 10, 
https://z.umn.edu/OrphansCtDecree. 
 88. See In re Estate of Girard, 132 A.3d at 627. 
 89. Id. The steering committee also presented the Board with the “Girard 
College Growback Framework and Transition Initiatives.” Id. The goal was to 
grow the residuary fund back to $350 million in ten years. Id.  
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renovations.90 Based on these recommendations, the Girard 
College Board requested in its cy pres petition to “temporarily 
modify the provisions of the Will to allow the elimination of the 
residential program and instead provide an extended day pro-
gram.”91  
In court, defining what sounded like impossibility rather 
than impracticability, the judges stated that “the cy pres doc-
trine cannot be invoked until it is clearly established that the 
directions of the donor cannot be carried into effect.”92 The 
court also focused on the temporary nature of the problem. The 
court noted that the Orphans’ Court found it significant, and 
they did not disagree, “that the Board does not represent that 
the residential aspect of Girard or the high school are perma-
nently impracticable” and, due to market upturns, the college 
was in a position to “cover the projected budget for the college 
for the coming year, operating with both a residential program 
and a high school.”93 Looking only at one year was deceptive, 
the Board claimed, because it did not take into account “neces-
sary infrastructure improvements,” tenancy loss in some of the 
college’s real estate holdings, or “an increase in capital expendi-
tures for properties held in the Estate’s real estate portfolio.”94 
The Girard College Board contended that the appropriate ques-
tion was “whether the Estate will have sufficient financial re-
sources to operate Girard College in perpetuity, as Stephen 
Girard desired.”95 This argument, however, did not persuade 
the court.96 
The problems with the judicial decision were many. The 
court never articulated a standard for evaluating cy pres based 
on impracticability. This absence of a standard allowed the 
court to reject the cy pres petition simply because of the per-
 
 90. Id. (noting that “[u]nder the proposal, grades 1 through 8 would be 
consolidated in the lower school buildings, which were the newest buildings on 
campus” but even so, “[f ]our million dollars in renovations to the lower school 
buildings would be necessary”). 
 91. Id. at 626. 
 92. Id. at 629, 637 (noting the Orphans’ Court conclusion and affirming its 
holding). 
 93. Id. at 629–30, 634. 
 94. Id. at 635. 
 95. Id. (“By limiting the scope of its review to 2013 and 2014, the Or-
phans’ Court failed to appreciate the critical financial challenges facing the 
Estate that inevitably will lead to an inability to continue operating the Col-
lege as an educational institution.”). 
 96. Id. at 636 (stating that the Girard College Board’s arguments from a 
fact and law argument lack merit and do not support reversal). 
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ceived temporary nature of the college’s problems. The court fo-
cused on the college being able to operate for one year, implying 
that normal operations were not impossible, thereby confusing 
the impossible and impracticable standards. A cy pres analysis 
centered on impracticability rather than impossibility might 
have focused on the long-term sustainability of the college and 
balanced donor intent with the burden to the institution creat-
ed by donor conditions. 
Equally problematic, in denying the cy pres petition, the 
court substituted its judgment about strategic planning and the 
exercise of discretion for the Girard College Board’s. The steer-
ing committee’s findings and the Girard College Board’s 
knowledge of the college’s financial situation both suggested 
that the college’s then-current operations were not sustainable, 
given declining revenue coupled with rising operational ex-
penses. The court, however, denied the Girard College Board 
the opportunity to exercise discretion and control in governing 
the institution. This rejection of the Girard College Board’s dis-
cretion runs contrary to powers attributed to fiduciaries in, for 
example, the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, which states: “A 
court will not interfere with a trustee’s exercise of a discretion-
ary power (or decision not to exercise the power) when that 
conduct is reasonable, not based on an improper interpretation 
of the terms of the trust, and not otherwise inconsistent with 
the trustee’s fiduciary duties.”97 
Ultimately, then, the court declined to approve any modifi-
cations based on the Girard College Board’s projections because 
of an uncertain standard that confused impossible with imprac-
ticable. The Girard College Board, consequently, was denied 
the ability to properly exercise its judgment as a fiduciary and 
use its institutional expertise to govern the institution. Modifi-
cation, in this case, was not available as a means to further in-
stitutional strategic planning or help improve the college’s posi-
tion prospectively because the financial situation was not 
sufficiently dire. 
3. Sweet Briar College: A Case Study in Donor Governance 
This need for discretionary latitude in governance flexibil-
ity was apparent in the recent near-failure of Sweet Briar Col-
lege. Sweet Briar opened its doors in 1906, founded with a be-
quest from Indiana Fletcher Williams, a wealthy Virginia 
 
 97. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 87 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2007). 
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woman.98 Williams left all her “plantation and a tract of land 
known as Sweet Briar Plantation” for the purposes of forming 
“a school or seminary for the education of white girls and young 
women” in memory of her deceased daughter, Daisy.99 From 
the time of its opening onward, Sweet Briar remained a wom-
en’s college dedicated to preparing young women to “be useful 
members of society.”100 
Suddenly and without warning, Sweet Briar College’s 
Board of Directors (Sweet Briar Board) announced in March 
2015 that the college would be closing its doors at the end of the 
academic year because of financial difficulties.101 President of 
the college, James F. Jones Jr., stated that “two key realities” 
had become inalterable obstacles to the college’s financial sus-
tainability: “the declining number” of women selecting to at-
tend single-sex institutions, as well as “the increase in the tui-
tion discount rate” that the college was extending to each new 
class of incoming students.102 From 2009 to 2015, enrollment 
had dropped from 611 students to 561; at the same time, the 
discount rate had increased from 48.9% to 61.9% for first year 
students.103 The Sweet Briar Board also reported that deferred 
maintenance expenses “were a factor in its decision to close.”104 
In an effort to control expenses, the college suspended all 
retirement contributions on behalf of employees for five 
months, the president worked for two weeks without pay, and a 
small number of administrative and support staff positions 
were eliminated.105 
 
 98. About: History, SWEET BRIAR COLL., http://sbc.edu/about/history (last 
visited Apr. 12, 2018). 
 99. INTERNET ARCHIVE, WILL OF INDIANA FLETCHER WILLIAMS 2–4, 
https://www.archive.org/stream/willofindianafle00unse#page/n5/mode/2up 
(last visited Apr. 12, 2018). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Christy Jackson, Board of Directors Votes To Close College at the End 
of 2014–2015 Academic Year, SWEET BRIAR COLL. (Mar. 4, 2015), http://sbc 
.edu/news/board-of-directors-votes-to-close-college-at-the-end-of-2014-2015 
-academic-year. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Scott Jaschik, Shocking Decision at Sweet Briar, INSIDE HIGHER ED. 
(Mar. 4, 2015), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/03/04/sweet-briar 
-college-will-shut-down. 
 104. John T. Casteen, Learning from Sweet Briar, ASSOC. OF GOVERNING 
BOARDS (2015), http://agb.org/trusteeship/2015/julyaugust/learning-from 
-sweet-briar. 
 105. Scott Jaschik, The Price of an Enrollment Shortfall, INSIDE HIGHER 
ED. (Nov. 30, 2009), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2009/11/30/ 
sweetbriar. 
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At the time that the Sweet Briar Board announced the 
closing, however, the college’s endowment was valued at ap-
proximately eighty-five million dollars.106 Moreover, the en-
dowment value, with some negligible fluctuation, had held 
steady since 2009.107 The Sweet Briar Board chair therefore 
remarked in an interview that he knew one particular question 
was on the minds of many: “Why don’t you keep going until the 
lights go out?”108 The total value of the endowment was, never-
theless, a misleading figure. According to Standard and Poor’s, 
only about one-fourth of the endowment funds were unrestrict-
ed.109 The restricted funds could not be used for general opera-
tions or as needed by college leadership, thereby rendering the 
college’s financial situation bleaker than the endowment value 
alone suggested. Despite the endowment value, the college was 
projecting a two million dollar deficit in 2015 and owed credi-
tors about twenty-five million dollars.110 One retired college 
president explained: “[The endowment is] not like a cookie jar 
that Sweet Briar can use to cover increasing deficits year after 
year.”111 
One solution would have been for the college to modify 
conditions placed on restricted endowed funds through cy pres. 
Lifting restrictions on potentially three-fourths of the endow-
ment—upward of sixty million dollars—could only have helped 
the college navigate its financial straits. The process might 
have been burdensome, petitioning for cy pres modifications on 
each restricted fund. Nevertheless, the option was there for the 
Sweet Briar Board as its members sought strategic ways to in-
crease disposable, unrestricted income. 
Instead, the Sweet Briar Board addressed another cy pres 
question: what to do with the college assets during and after 
the school’s closure. One month after announcing the closure, 
college administrators sent letters to living donors requesting 
permission to use restricted endowed funds for “general chari-
table purposes . . . including costs that the Sweet Briar Board 
(or a committee acting on its behalf) determines are necessary 
and proper to effect the closure of the college and winding up of 
 
 106. Jaschik, supra note 103. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Ry Rivard, Who Gets the Endowment?, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Mar. 5, 
2015), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/03/05/where-will-sweet 
-briars-85m-endowment-go. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
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its affairs.”112 An outraged alumnae group quickly mobilized 
and responded by requesting an injunction that would prevent 
the college from using any donor funds in service of closing the 
school.113 Before litigation could get too far, however, the par-
ties reached a settlement and an infusion of cash from alumnae 
allowed Sweet Briar to keep its doors open.114 As part of the 
settlement, the state attorney general agreed to lift restrictions 
on sixteen million dollars in the college’s endowment fund.115 
Left unanswered were questions about how the court 
would have treated any cy pres claims if the Sweet Briar Board 
had pursued modifications instead of settling with the alum-
nae. Whether the Sweet Briar Board had asked to lift re-
strictions to continue operating, or, alternately, to proceed with 
the closure, it is possible that a court evaluating the school’s fi-
nances might have been inclined to reject the petitions because 
of the relatively robust endowment fund that existed. Sweet 
Briar was not in the immediate financial crisis that the Corco-
ran was when the trustees submitted their cy pres petition. 
Sweet Briar looked more like Girard College than the Corcoran 
in that the present crisis was based on future predictions of un-
sustainable finances caused, in part, by restricted gifts. And, 
similar to the Girard case, these restrictions on endowed funds 
had created a system of donor governance that hampered 
Sweet Briar’s leadership from fulfilling fiduciary duties and 
exercising strategic control over college operations.116 But, 
 
 112. Complaint at 41, Commonwealth ex rel. Bowyer v. Sweet Briar Inst., 
No. 15009373 (Va. Cir. Ct. Mar. 30, 2015). 
 113. Id. at 3. The alumnae group argued that all donor contributions—
including college property and land given by Indiana Williams—were subject 
to trust rules and had to be treated as charitable gifts. Id. The alumnae group 
based their argument concerning Williams’ founding gift on the fact that Indi-
ana Williams’ bequest provided for the perpetual existence of Sweet Briar and 
stated: “No part of the [donated land] shall at any time be sold or alienated by 
the corporation . . . [and] the personal property herein given shall be kept invi-
olate as an endowment fund . . . .” Id. at 16. The question of whether trust 
rules could apply to the college as a nonprofit corporation went to the Virginia 
Supreme Court and the conclusion was that trust law could indeed apply. 
Commonwealth ex rel. Bowyer v. Sweet Briar Inst., No. 150619, 2015 WL 
3646914, at *2 (Va. June 9, 2015). 
 114. Scott Jaschik, Sweet Briar Survives, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (June 22, 
2015), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/06/22/deal-will-save-sweet 
-briar-college. 
 115. Id. 
 116. David Yermack, Donor Governance and Financial Management in 
Prominent US Art Museums, 41 J. CULTURAL ECON. 215, 216 (2017) (discuss-
ing how donor restrictions “limit operating flexibility in a way that could com-
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without additional evidence of imminent failure, a court may 
not have been convinced that cy pres modification was appro-
priate as a means of solving Sweet Briar’s financial predica-
ment. 
As the Corcoran, Girard, and Sweet Briar cases all demon-
strate, income flexibility is critical when institutions are in fi-
nancial distress, whether the distress is caused by decreased 
government funding, increased operational costs, or endow-
ment erosion. And in all cases, gift restrictions hampered the 
ability of institutional fiduciaries to fulfill their duties to the 
institution by undertaking creative solutions to financial prob-
lems. Without a clear standard for cy pres in the context of fi-
nancial hardship, institutions like Sweet Briar and Girard will 
continue to find themselves in an unenviable position, unable 
to either use gift funds or escape from the gift restrictions until 
their position is one of financial desperation like the Corcoran. 
As one commentator has noted, “Boards at other institu-
tions will face issues not unlike the ones Sweet Briar is facing 
now.”117 A confused impracticability standard will leave these 
institutional leaders without the ability to exercise their best 
judgment in administering institutional assets during the 
times when managerial expertise and flexibility are most need-
ed. 
II.  TRUST LAW’S BALANCING ACT   
In the search for a more consistent cy pres standard, con-
tract and property law are both effective tools for rebuilding 
trust law. Trust law shares important architectural features 
with both contract and property law, resembling each in certain 
doctrinal ways and replicating both in conceptual terms. Con-
tract law offers lessons in promise keeping and agreement 
compliance. Property law, on the other hand, evidences a 
strong concern for meeting needs through the productive use of 
assets. This Part analyzes how contract and property doctrines 
address questions analogous to those posed in the cy pres con-
text and how those doctrines resolve the questions. 
 
promise an organization’s efficiency . . . because they constrain the opportuni-
ties for non-profit managers to expropriate resources”). 
 117. Casteen, supra note 104. 
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A. RULES FOR KEEPING PROMISES 
Contract law is the only other body of law with an actual 
doctrine of impracticability, and it shares many qualities with 
the trust law doctrine. For this reason alone, an inquiry into 
the relationship between contract and trust is warranted. The 
trust and contract law comparison is also appropriate because 
the two bodies of law share theoretical underpinnings. This 
Section explores the historical connection between trust and 
contract, and then analyzes the contract doctrine of impractica-
bility. 
1. The Trust-Contract Connection 
Trust and contract law are built around similar conceptual 
puzzles concerning how agreements are made, what promises 
must be kept, and what the default rules of obligation are. In 
the following discussion, I explore the similarities between 
trust and contract law, paying particular attention to the sta-
tus of charitable trusts and gifts. 
a. Making the Historical Connection 
Trust law shares a conceptual relationship with contract 
law because both bodies of law have historically carried with 
them the idea of agreement and obligation. Maitland, writing 
in the early 1900s, observed that “when the English Chancellor 
first began to enforce the trust, the trust ‘generally ha[d] its 
origin in something that we can not but call an agreement.’”118 
Maitland also observed that “[the] trust was originally regard-
ed as an obligation, in point of fact a contract though not usual-
ly so called.”119 Likewise, Holdsworth wrote, “Chancellors car-
ried with them into the court of Chancery the idea that faith 
should be kept; and enforced agreements, . . . whenever they 
thought that in the interests of good faith and honest dealing, 
they ought to be enforced.”120 A guiding principle in Chancery, 
 
 118. Langbein, supra note 17, at 628. Langbein states: “Sensitivity to the 
contractarian character of the trust can be traced to Maitland’s celebrated lec-
tures on Equity, published posthumously in 1909.” Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 456 
(1922). See also W.T. BARBOUR, THE HISTORY OF CONTRACT IN EARLY ENGLISH 
EQUITY 166 (1914) (discussing that there is “a moral duty” to fulfill promises 
and that such promises should be enforced). 
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the site of all trust litigation, was pacta sunt servanda (promis-
es must be kept).121 
In the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, le-
gal scholars and commentators posited that trust claims could 
be categorized as either property or contract claims.122 And 
while the majority of commentators pressed the property law 
connection, scholars like Henry Ballow made attempts to fur-
ther the analogy between trust and contract law. Ballow identi-
fied the trust “as a species of contract”123 and the analogy be-
tween trust and contract, as imagined by Ballow, was a 
productive means “of integration of the trust concept both into 
the general body of the law”124 and of “analyzing and classify-
ing the case-law on trusts.”125 Furthermore, Ballow observed 
that trust and contract law both had a jurisdictional home in 
Chancery, where claims “regard[ed] not the outward form, but 
the inward substance and essence of the matter, . . . where the 
persons interested fully intend[ed] to contract a perfect obliga-
tion, though, by mistake or accident, they omit[ted] the set 
form of law.”126 Legal historians note, however, that the con-
tract analogy was ultimately overshadowed by the analogy to 
property.127 
In a modern context, John Langbein has argued that it is 
important to revive this understanding of trusts as contracts. 
 
 121. JOHN H. LANGBEIN, RENEE LETTOW LERNER & BRUCE P. SMITH, HIS-
TORY OF THE COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL 
INSTITUTIONS 311 (2009) (“Almost all cases in Chancery can be reduced to this 
simple formula, and the answer of conscience was as simple: promises have to 
be kept—pacta sunt servanda . . . .” (citing Franz Metzger, The Last Phase of 
the Medieval Chancery, in LAW-MAKING AND LAW-MAKERS IN BRITISH HISTO-
RY 79, 84 (Alan Harding ed., 1980))). 
 122. Michael Macnair, The Conceptual Basis of Trusts in the Later 17th 
and Early 18th Centuries, in ITINERA FIDUCIAE 207, 235 (Richard Helmholz & 
Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 1998). Hansmann and Mattei remark that “in 
the continental legal tradition it was obligation that played the most im-
portant role in framing trust-like arrangements.” Hansmann & Mattei, supra 
note 13, at 441. 
 123. Jones, supra note 16, at 162 (citing HENRY BALLOW, A TREATISE OF 
EQUITY (1737)). 
 124. Macnair, supra note 122. Ballow is generally credited with writing the 
1737 A TREATISE OF EQUITY. See, e.g., WILLIAM & MARY L. LIB., A Treatise of 
Equity, WYTHEPEDIA: THE GEORGE WYTHE ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www 
.lawlibrary.wm.edu/wythepedia/index.php/Treatise_of_Equity (last visited 
Apr. 12, 2018).  
 125. Id. 
 126. JOHN LORD ELDON, A TREATISE OF EQUITY 40–41 (1820). 
 127. Macnair, supra note 122 (“English law schools . . . teach trusts as a 
branch of property law, not a branch of obligations.”). 
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Langbein writes that the contract analogy has become increas-
ingly apt “in light of the great changes that have occurred in 
the character and function of the modern trust.”128 Langbein 
observes that “[t]he modern trust has become a management 
regime for a portfolio of financial assets,”129 making the con-
tractual nature of trusts readily apparent. Langbein points 
specifically to changes in the fiduciary-duty standard in trust 
law, the new prevalence of institutional trustees, and the reli-
ance on the remedy of specific performance as evidence of the 
likeness between trust and contract.130 Trusts, like contracts, 
may also share long-term goals since “contracting parties may 
be assumed to desire a set of contract terms that will maximize 
the value of the exchange.”131 The bottom line: “Trusts are con-
tracts.”132 
b. Are Charitable Gift Agreements Contracts? 
Private trusts may indeed be contracts, but there is still a 
question about whether charitable trusts fit the rubric. Lang-
bein excludes charitable trusts from his account of trust as con-
tract, stating that “contractarian autonomy is more restrained” 
with the charitable trust.133 Trust and gift instruments are, he 
observes, a highly specialized form of contract with a third-
party beneficiary: “Charitable trusts are quasi-public institu-
tions that must satisfy standards of public benefit articulated 
both in the common law and in the tax code and regulatory 
law.”134 Donors and institutions are not, therefore, contracting 
with full freedom. Donors must align charitable gifts with the 
institution’s mission, which is in turn circumscribed by the 
charitable purposes doctrine and tax law.135 Charitable trusts 
 
 128. Langbein, supra note 17, at 643. 
 129. Id. at 629. 
 130. Id. at 628 (“The law of fiduciary administration, which is the center-
piece of the modern trust, is overwhelmingly contractarian.”). 
 131. Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related 
Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 89 
(1977). 
 132. Langbein, supra note 17, at 627. 
 133. Id. at 631. 
 134. Id. See also William P. Sullivan, The Restricted Charitable Gift as 
Third-Party Beneficiary Contract, 52 HIGHER REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 79 
(2017) (stating that contract is the appropriate lens for analyzing restricted 
gifts because of the principle of private autonomy). 
 135. The charitable purposes doctrine is codified by the UTC and states 
that: “A charitable trust may be created for the relief of poverty, the advance-
ment of education or religion, the promotion of health, governmental or munic-
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and gift agreements are, from this perspective, a carve-out from 
his general proposition. 
In other respects, however, the analogy still stands. Alex 
Johnson and Ross Taylor have taken up this question and con-
cluded that charitable trusts are best understood as relational 
contracts. “[T]he charitable trust,” they observe, “is in some re-
spects the prototypical relational contract: it is a long-term, in-
herently flexible arrangement that employs fiduciary standards 
as a bonding mechanism . . . and in which the precise terms of 
the agreement (trust) are incapable of resolution ex ante.”136 
Charitable trust and gift agreements can be understood as rela-
tional contracts in the sense that “the object of contracting is 
not primarily to allocate risks, but to signify a commitment to 
cooperate.”137 Charitable gift agreements, like relational con-
tracts, are defined by the impossibility of complete knowledge. 
Gift agreements cannot ever be drafted such that they are re-
sponsive to and address all the external events as well as ad-
ministrative problems that come with time.138 
In addition, charitable gift agreements are almost always 
long-term agreements, even when the agreement governs the 
terms of a spend-down gift instead of an endowed one. In this 
respect, gift agreements—like relational contracts—tend to be 
agreements in which “the parties are presumed to have intend-
ed an open-ended relationship, with the contract providing a 
framework within which adjustment may continually take 
place.”139 Endowed gift agreements that exist in perpetuity, in 
particular, share with relational contracts this quality of open-
endedness given that the gift restrictions on these gifts may 
govern the gift administration for not just decades, but centu-
ries. In such cases, “[w]here the future contingencies are pecu-
 
ipal purposes, or other purposes the achievement of which is beneficial to the 
community.” UNIF. TR. CODE § 405(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000). 
 136. Alex M. Johnson Jr. & Ross D. Taylor, Revolutionizing Judicial Inter-
pretation of Charitable Trusts: Applying Relational Contracts and Dynamic 
Interpretation to Cy Pres and America’s Cup Litigation, 74 IOWA L. REV. 545, 
571 (1989). 
 137. Sheldon W. Halpern, Application of the Doctrine of Commercial Im-
practicability: Searching for “The Wisdom of Solomon,” 135 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1123, 1171 (1987) (quoting Robert W. Gordon, Macaulay, Macneil, and 
the Discovery of Solidarity and Power in Contract Law, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 565, 
569). 
 138. For this reason, the prevailing tendency in development offices is 
therefore to draft agreements that specify fewer details and build in more flex-
ibility rather than less. 
 139. Halpern, supra note 137 at 1171. 
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liarly intricate or uncertain”—as happens with both long-term 
gift agreements and relational contracts—“practical difficulties 
arise that impede the contracting parties’ efforts to allocate op-
timally all risks at the time of contracting.”140 From this per-
spective, charitable gift agreements strongly resemble relation-
al contracts. 
2. Contract Law and Commercial Impracticability 
Contract law, like trust law, has doctrines that allow one 
party’s obligations to be excused in limited circumstances. The 
doctrines of impossibility, impracticability, and frustration—
collectively named the doctrines of excuse—are available in 
cases of changed circumstances, frustration of purpose, and 
economic hardship. This Section analyzes the contours of com-
mercial impracticability and explains how the doctrine has 
played out in several landmark cases. 
a. Contract’s Doctrines of Excuse 
Before 1863, the leading case concerning excuse and dis-
charge from contract terms was Paradine v. Jane.141 In Pa-
radine, the landlord brought an action to recover unpaid rent 
from a tenant who raised the defense that he had been de-
prived of enjoying the rented property because an invading en-
emy army had demolished it.142 The tenant argued that he 
should have been excused from paying further rental payments 
to the landlord, once the army had laid waste to the proper-
ty.143 The court did not find this defense persuasive and con-
cluded that the tenant bore the risks of performance since he 
could have made contractual provisions to guard himself 
against unforeseen contingencies.144 
In 1863, however, the doctrine changed. Taylor v. Cald-
well145 established the doctrine of impossibility.146 Caldwell 
 
 140. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 
67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1090 (1981). 
 141. Paradine v. Jane (1647) 82 Eng. Rep. 897. 
 142. Id. at 897. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Taylor v. Caldwell (1863) 122 Eng. Rep. 309. 
 146. One scholar argues that three cases excusing performance predate 
Taylor: Williams v. Lloyd (1628) 82 Eng. Rep. 95 (detailing a case where the 
subject matter of the contract of bailment was destroyed); Hyde v. Dean & 
Canons of Windsor (1557) 78 Eng. Rep. 798 (articulating a situation where a 
party to a personal services contract died); Abbott of Westminster v. Clerke 
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owned a music hall that he rented to Taylor for use as a concert 
venue, but before the concerts could take place, the hall burned 
to the ground.147 Taylor then sued Caldwell for breach of con-
tract.148 Taylor held that an implied condition did exist in the 
contract that would excuse one party from performance under 
certain, exceptional circumstances, in the absence of express 
terms to the contrary.149 The court stated: “[I]n contracts in 
which the performance depends on the continued existence of a 
given person or thing, a condition is implied that the impossi-
bility of performance arising from the perishing of the person or 
thing shall excuse the performance.”150 After Taylor, courts be-
gan to allow discharge from obligation and performance 
“[w]here the parties’ particular purpose [had] been frustrated 
by an unanticipated contingency, . . . since the bargain [had] 
lost its value.”151 
The doctrine of commercial impracticability first emerged 
in Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard in 1916.152 The parties 
had entered into a written agreement obliging the defendants 
to haul gravel from the plaintiff ’s land to prepare it for the con-
struction of a bridge.153 When a conflict arose because the de-
fendants had hauled less than expected or bargained for, the 
court ruled in favor of the defendants. The court wrote that the 
defendants could not have hauled out any more gravel “‘by or-
dinary means,’ or except by the use, at great expense, of a 
stream dredger, and the earth and gravel so taken could not 
have been used without first having been dried at great ex-
pense and delay.”154 
Following the logic of Taylor and its progeny, the Mineral 
Park court observed that it was “well settled that, where per-
formance depends upon the existence of a given thing, and such 
existence was assumed as the basis of the agreement, perfor-
 
(1536) 73 Eng. Rep. 59 (describing a case where a supervening illegality due to 
a subsequent Act of Parliament excused performance). See John Henry Schle-
gel, Of Nuts, and Ships, and Sealing Wax, Suez, and Frustrating Things—The 
Doctrine of Impossibility of Performance, 23 RUTGERS L. REV. 419, 420 (1969). 
 147. Taylor, 122 Eng. Rep. at 310. 
 148. Id. at 311. 
 149. Id. at 312. 
 150. Id. at 314. 
 151. Paula Walter, Commercial Impracticability in Contracts, 61 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 225, 232 (1987). 
 152. Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, 156 P. 458 (Cal. 1916). 
 153. Id. at 458. 
 154. Id. at 459. 
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mance is excused to the extent that the thing ceases to exist or 
turns out to be nonexistent.”155 Extending this logic, the court 
concluded that impossibility meant more than a literal change 
in circumstance: “A thing is impossible in legal contemplation 
when it is not practicable; and a thing is impracticable when it 
can only be done at an excessive and unreasonable cost.”156 The 
court qualified this statement, however, by adding that a de-
fendant could not raise this defense solely because costs ex-
ceeded original estimations and therefore entailed a financial 
loss for the defendant.157 Rather, “where the difference in cost 
is so great as here, and has the effect, as found, of making per-
formance impracticable, the situation is not different from that 
of a total absence of earth and gravel.”158 
The question left unanswered by Mineral Park has persist-
ed, that is, at what point does cost and hardship become prohib-
itive. Put another way: “When does a difference in degree be-
come a difference in kind?”159 As Mineral Park concluded, 
“Economic events which are unpredictable to some extent can-
not be the subject of an action to discharge or to reform merely 
because the parties are disappointed with the manner in which 
events unfolded.”160 A number of courts have declined to extend 
Mineral Park’s broad holding to other scenarios. In W.H. Edgar 
& Son v. Grocers’ Wholesale Co., an Eighth Circuit case not 
long after Mineral Park, the court returned to a dictionary def-
inition of impracticable—“[i]ncapable of being practiced, per-
formed, or accomplished by the means employed or at com-
mand”161—and concluded that this “common and ordinary”162 
meaning was appropriate in the absence of “financial panic or 
depression.”163  
The bulk of impracticability cases, however, have arisen 
only in the past half century, as “courts have attempted to 
 
 155. Id. at 459 (citing Williams v. Miller, 68 Cal. 290 (Cal. 1885); Brick Co. 
v. Pond, 38 Ohio St. 65 (Ohio 1882); see also Ridgely v. Conewago Iron Co., 
53 F. 988 (E.D. Pa. 1893)). 
 156. Mineral Park Land Co., 156 P. at 460 (citing 1 BEACH ON CONTRACTS 
§ 216 (1897)). 
 157. Id. at 460. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Walter, supra note 151, at 234. 
 160. Id. at 253. 
 161. W.H. Edgar & Son v. Grocers’ Wholesale Co., 1 F.2d 219, 223 (8th Cir. 
1924). 
 162. W.H. Edgar & Son, 1 F.2d at 223. 
 163. Id. 
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make sensible application of the doctrine to a confused and 
complex commercial world in which contractual relations were 
formed in a context, if not of war, then of the rumors of war, 
embargo, shortages, and inflation.”164 In this modern context, 
the Third Circuit has articulated the general standard: “The 
party seeking to excuse his performance must not only show 
that he can perform only at a loss but also that the loss will be 
especially severe and unreasonable.”165 Section 2-615 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code, followed by the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts,166 sets forth the minimum requirements for 
excusing contract performance, stating that nonperformance is 
excused “if performance as agreed has been made impracticable 
by the occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of which 
was a basic assumption on which the contract was made.” Nei-
ther courts nor uniform law provides any additional guidance 
on how to “define or categorize those contingencies which enti-
tle a party to claim impracticability.”167 
Like trust law impracticability, then, contract impractica-
bility can be a blurry doctrine that forces judicial guesswork 
about the intention of contracting parties.168 Nevertheless, the 
focus is on extreme cost in the context of extreme circumstanc-
es brought on by war, natural disaster, unforeseen events, and 
financial panic. 
b. ALCOA: The Role of Financial Hardship 
The modern commercial impracticability doctrine was 
forged in a time of international crisis and inflation when “the 
uncertainty surrounding the growth and development of pri-
vate nuclear power . . . [and] the sharp increase in fuel costs . . . 
 
 164. Halpern, supra note 137, at 1145. 
 165. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Fed. Power Comm’n., 563 F.2d 588, 600 (3d Cir. 
1977). 
 166. U.C.C. § 2-615 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N). The Restate-
ment “treats impracticability of performance and frustration of purpose as 
tandem concepts, placing each squarely in the realm of inherent judicial power 
to do what justice requires by way of relieving contractual obligation where 
extraordinary circumstance so requires.” Nicholas R. Weiskopf, Frustration of 
Contractual Purpose—Doctrine or Myth, 70 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 239, 259 (1996). 
 167. Walter, supra note 151, at 227. 
 168. See Marianne M. Jennings, Commercial Impracticability—Does It Re-
ally Exist?, 2 WHITTIER L. REV. 241 (1980); Schlegel, supra note 146; John H. 
Stroh, The Failure of the Doctrine of Impracticability, 5 CORP. L. REV. 195 
(1982); George Wallach, The Excuse Defense in the Law of Contracts: Judicial 
Frustration of the U.C.C. Attempt To Liberalize the Law of Commercial Im-
practicability, 55 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 203 (1979). 
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provided the dramatic setting for the troubled and, to many, 
troubling, judicial treatment of impracticability.”169 One reason 
for increased fuel costs was the closure of the Suez Canal, 
which forced ships to travel around the Cape of Good Hope.170 
This rerouting resulted in extra expense, which in turn led to a 
spate of cases turning on the claim of commercial impracticabil-
ity.171 Consequently, “[t]he modern . . . doctrine of commercial 
impracticability . . . finds its most recognized illustrations in 
the so-called ‘Suez cases,’ arising out of the various closings of 
the Suez Canal.”172 
In Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. United States, for ex-
ample, the plaintiff company claimed it had a right to be paid 
the increased cost of shipping a full cargo of wheat from Texas 
to Iran via the Cape of Good Hope because of the Suez Canal 
closure.173 The court held that performance was not impracti-
cable and therefore not excused.174 That the Suez Canal might 
be closed, the court remarked, was foreseeable, and the condi-
tions the ship faced taking the alternate route were not oner-
ous.175 The only difference, the court stated, was the cost.176 
The court added that cost could, potentially, render perfor-
mance impracticable.177 However, the court concluded, “to justi-
fy relief there must be more of a variation between expected 
cost and the cost of performing by an available alternative.”178 
The Transatlantic court set forth what would be a recurring re-
frain—cost may count, but not here. Other courts followed this 
line of reasoning, and the vast majority of commercial impracti-
 
 169. Halpern, supra note 137, at 1145. 
 170. See, e.g., Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. United States, 
363 F.2d 312, 314–15 (D.C. Cir. 1966). 
 171. Id. 
 172. E. Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429, 438 (S.D. Fla. 
1975). 
 173. Transatlantic, 363 F.2d at 315. 
 174. Id. at 320. 
 175. Id. at 319 (“The goods shipped were not subject to harm from the 
longer, less temperate Southern route.”). 
 176. Id. (“The only factor operating here in the appellant’s favor is the add-
ed expense, [which was] allegedly $43,972.00 above and beyond the contract 
price of $305,842.92.”). 
 177. Id. (“[I]t may be an overstatement to say that increased cost and diffi-
culty of performance never constitute impracticability. . . .”). 
 178. Id. 
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cability claims failed. One major exception was the ALCOA 
case.179 
In Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc., (AL-
COA), the two parties entered into an agreement that ALCOA 
would provide Essex with its long-term aluminum needs, so 
that Essex could expand its operations into the manufacture of 
aluminum wire products.180 The contract contained a price es-
calation formula that varied the price per pound in accordance 
with changes in the Wholesale Price Index–Industrial Com-
modities (WPI).181 This escalation formula “was intended by 
the parties to reflect actual changes in the cost of the non-labor 
items utilized by ALCOA in the production of aluminum from 
alumina at its Warrick, Indiana smelting plant.”182 The prob-
lem began in 1973, when “OPEC actions to increase oil prices 
and unanticipated pollution control costs greatly increased AL-
COA’s electricity costs.”183 Electric power rates rose much more 
rapidly than the WPI, and ALCOA was faced with a substantial 
cost increase.184 The court credited ALCOA’s evidence that the 
company stood to lose in excess of $75,000,000 if forced to carry 
through on its contractual obligation.185 
The court set forth the Restatement and the UCC stand-
ards and stated: 
A mere change in the degree of difficulty or expense due to such caus-
es as increased wages, prices of raw materials, or costs of construc-
tion, unless well beyond the normal range, does not amount to im-
practicability since it is this sort of risk that a fixed-price contract is 
intended to cover.186  
The court also noted that variations in value and price “are the 
rule rather than the exception,” and that relief could only be 
granted “when the variation in value is very great and is 
caused by a supervening event that was not in fact contemplat-
ed by the parties and the risk of which was not allocated by 
them.”187 
 
 179. Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Grp., Inc. (ALCOA), 499 F. Supp. 53 
(W.D. Pa. 1980). 
 180. Id. at 55–56. 
 181. Id. at 56. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 58. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at 59. 
 186. Id. at 72 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 281 cmt. d 
(AM. LAW INST. 1981)). 
 187. Id. at 72–73 (quoting ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 
§ 1355 (1962)). 
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The court nevertheless observed that there could be excep-
tional circumstances that merited relief, such as “a severe 
shortage of raw materials or of supplies due to a contingency 
such as war, embargo, local crop failure, unforeseen shutdown 
of major sources of supply or the like, which either causes a 
marked increase in cost or altogether prevents the seller from 
securing supplies necessary to his performance.”188 The ALCOA 
situation, the court concluded, was such a case.189 
Ruling in favor of ALCOA, the court stated: “This strict 
standard of severe disappointment is clearly met in the present 
case.”190 The court found that ALCOA had sufficiently proved 
that the company stood to lose “well over $60 million dollars 
out of pocket over the life of the contract due to the extreme de-
viation of the WPI-IC from ALCOA’s actual costs.”191 Preceding 
cases, the court reasoned, had not shown such a “gravity of 
harm.”192 Moreover, the court mentioned that “the circum-
stances surrounding the contract show a deliberate avoidance 
of abnormal risks.”193 
Later cases have consistently declined to follow this exam-
ple, which now stands out as an outlier result and has been 
widely criticized.194 Nevertheless, the court’s decision in AL-
COA offers a useful benchmark for demonstrating that finan-
cial hardship is sometimes so severe that a party merits relief. 
Indeed, ALCOA stands for the proposition that there is a point 
at which contract enforcement would be manifestly unjust to 
one party, and that party would suffer economic consequences 
capable of changing the entire financial life of the company. In 
Transatlantic, the court observed: “The doctrine ultimately 
represents the ever-shifting line, drawn by courts hopefully re-
sponsive to commercial practices and mores, at which the com-
munity’s interest in having contracts enforced according to 
their terms is outweighed by the commercial senselessness of 
 
 188. Id. at 74. (quoting U.C.C. § 2-615 cmt. 4 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N 1977)). 
 189. Id. at 76. 
 190. Id. at 73. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. at 76. 
 193. Id. at 75. 
 194. Halpern, supra note 137, at 1126 (stating “in the seven years since the 
case was decided, ALCOA has had little impact on judicial thought”). 
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requiring performance.”195 In ALCOA, the court identified that 
line.196 
c. Westinghouse: Why Is Hardship So Hard 
Westinghouse, like ALCOA, is a story of the energy crisis 
and it tracks the history of nuclear power.197 In 1964, Congress 
enacted legislation that permitted private ownership of urani-
um, an essential component of nuclear power.198 Westinghouse 
was optimistic about the future of nuclear power: “Westing-
house, a manufacturer of [nuclear steam supply] systems, was 
most anxious to enter into a contract with Florida for its pro-
posed plants . . . .”199 The court remarked that there was great 
uncertainty in the industry: “While the potential for nuclear 
powered plants for the production of electricity was considered 
bright, reactor sales were not abundant . . . . [U]ncertainty ex-
isted during the period of 1965–66 as to whether nuclear power 
could compete economically in most areas of the country with 
fossil fuels.”200 
Westinghouse nevertheless entered into negotiations with 
Florida to build nuclear reactors for the state.201 Because the 
state of Florida had no expertise in nuclear power at the time, 
Florida officials insisted on Westinghouse providing a full 
package of services.202 In order to finalize the contract and in 
anticipation of profit, “Westinghouse took a calculated risk,”203 
agreeing to “a guaranteed ten year fuel cycle cost”204 that in-
cluded “the cost of uranium and the purchase and disposal of 
the spent fuel as a part of the fuel cycle.”205 The contract obli-
gated Westinghouse to dispose of the fuel “as [the company] 
sees fit,” and both parties contemplated reprocessing as the 
most likely mode of disposal.206 However, commercial repro-
 
 195. Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 315 
(D.C. Cir. 1966). 
 196. ALCOA, 499 F. Supp. at 79. 
 197. In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 517 F. 
Supp. 440, 443 (E.D. Va. 1981). 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. See id. 
 202. Id. at 444. 
 203. Id. at 446. 
 204. Id. at 444. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. at 443. 
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cessing was not a common technique used for disposal and 
Westinghouse “fully understood” that the deal was premised on 
what the company then deemed to be a reasonable business 
risk that “commercial reprocessing would come to pass and 
would be economically feasible.”207 
Reprocessing, unfortunately for Westinghouse, never be-
came economically feasible.208 Moreover, eleven years after the 
signing of the contract, a presidential ban was placed on repro-
cessing, sealing Westinghouse’s fate.209 Consequently, except 
for eighteen spent fuel assemblies that Westinghouse removed 
(out of an estimated 981 spent fuel assemblies over the life of 
the contract), the company did not dispose of any spent fuel.210 
Because of Westinghouse’s refusal to remove the spent fuel and 
consequent breach of contract, Florida was forced to spend ap-
proximately ten million dollars to store the spent fuel, which 
resulted in “increased operating and maintenance costs, as well 
as potential environmental difficulties.”211 Florida subsequent-
ly filed a breach of promise claim against Westinghouse, seek-
ing monetary damages for the money spent to store the spent 
fuel, as well as a court order for Westinghouse to remove this 
fuel.212 Westinghouse claimed commercial impracticability as a 
defense.213 
The court concluded that “the facts simply do not support 
the conclusion that Westinghouse’s performance has been ren-
dered impracticable”214 and referred to the “plain language of 
the contract”215 that obligated Westinghouse to remove the 
spent fuel. The court recognized that Westinghouse had antici-
pated a profit from reprocessing the fuel, which had not come to 
pass, but noted that increased expense was not generally a 
winning argument.216 Furthermore, the court explained: 
“[I]mpracticability by reason of additional expense is not to be 
determined by reference to the loss, or failure to profit, from 
one particular contract term in isolation. Rather, it is to be 
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judged from the perspective of the entire undertaking.”217 Ac-
cording to this holistic analysis, Westinghouse had assumed a 
certain risk and the fact that no profit had been obtained from 
fuel reprocessing did not lead to a finding of impracticability.218 
The larger part of the court’s analysis, however, dealt with 
the foreseeability of the result. If a “promisor had no reason to 
anticipate a supervening event which radically increases the 
difficulty of performance, or which renders performance impos-
sible, it is manifestly unfair to hold him to the agreement.”219 
The relevant example for the court was a total crop failure.220 
The rationale for holding parties to a high standard of foresee-
ability was that, if the parties could have reasonably anticipat-
ed an event, then the parties should have bargained for provi-
sions to protect themselves in the eventuality of such 
occurrences.221 The court acknowledged that “the future is by 
definition unknowable,” but a party to a contract could, or 
should be “aware of a certain trend, or that a given state of af-
fairs is in flux, or that an assumption is more than usually un-
certain.”222 
The court further emphasized that Florida had specifically 
bargained to have no responsibility for fuel removal. The court 
repeated the statement of Florida’s chief executive officer, who 
said: “I do not want to buy a sheep to get a suit of clothes, and 
have the sheep sheared, dyed, treated, woven into cloth, cut, 
and sewn into a suit . . . . I want to buy a suit already made.”223 
The court also had little doubt about Westinghouse’s assump-
tion of risk: “Westinghouse was, in its eagerness to construct 
the power plants, willing to accept risks which Florida was not 
willing to take.”224 In short, Westinghouse had been eager to 
reap anticipated profit and had failed to bargain for any provi-
sions that would have saved the company in the event of mar-
ket changes and new regulation. 
Westinghouse, consequently, affirmed the proposition that, 
absent cataclysmic intervening circumstances, parties were re-
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sponsible for creating various forms of self-protection through 
bargaining.225 While degree of monetary loss and economic 
hardship are factors, then, in the assessment of commercial 
impracticability, corporate and contract norms place even 
greater weight on the ability of contracting parties to bargain 
and create their own contractual exit mechanisms. Financial 
hardship may create impracticable circumstances. Companies, 
however, are expected to bargain around foreseeable difficul-
ties. 
B. RULES FOR MEETING NEEDS 
If contract law provides lessons about keeping promises, 
property law provides lessons about meeting needs. And if con-
tract law is about managing the relationship between parties, 
property law is about the managing the asset. In this Section, I 
explain the longstanding connections between trust and prop-
erty law and analyze relevant doctrines that property law has 
to offer as examples of what property owners can do in situa-
tions of difficulty, need, and impracticability. 
1. The Trust-Property Connection 
However compelling the comparison between trust and 
contract is, the comparison between trust and property is the 
conventional one. Trust has long been considered a form or 
branch of property law, and most accounts focus on trust’s 
“proprietary interests and relations.”226 This approach is often 
based on the trust’s origin as a means of conveying land.227 
Moreover, historically, a trust could not exist without the 
res.228 Whereas a maxim of equity is that a trust will not fail 
for the want of a trustee, the same cannot be said when the 
trust asset is absent. The asset—property—is critical to the 
creation and maintenance of a trust. 
a. The Roots of the Connection 
Early modern legal writers, including Blackstone, analo-
gized the trust to a Roman form of property ownership called 
the fideicommissum, which emphasized the proprietary nature 
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of the trust.229 Another analogy, that between the trust and the 
usufruct, also strengthened the property facet of the trust.230 
To further these analogies and draw out the property nature of 
trusts, commentators have routinely highlighted the benefi-
ciary’s interest in the trust property, and the fact that trusts 
are a vehicle for wealth transfer: “trusts of land descend as 
land should, including following local custom of the land where 
the property is located.”231 
The more modern debate concerning the nature of trust ex-
tended these conversations and became, in many ways, a dia-
logue between Frederic W. Maitland and Austin W. Scott.232 
Maitland was “the greatest scholar of the common law” and 
“got the contractarian basis of the trust right,” according to 
Langbein. Nevertheless, Scott “had the fortitude to write his 
error into the Restatement of Trusts.”233 The first Restatement 
of Trusts, from 1935, said “[t]he creation of a trust is conceived 
of as a conveyance of the beneficial interest in the trust proper-
ty rather than as a contract.”234 More recently, Henry Hans-
mann and Ugo Mattei supported the trust-as-property theory 
by highlighting the importance of trust law’s asset partitioning 
function. Hansmann and Mattei suggest “that it is precisely the 
property-like aspects of the trust that are the principal contri-
bution of trust law.”235 Of particular importance to Hansmann 
and Mattei is the way in which spendthrift and discretionary 
trusts enable a beneficiary to shelter assets from creditors. 
Hansmann and Mattei observe, “[w]hen we say that assets are 
someone’s property, we generally mean (among other things) 
that those assets are presumed available to satisfy claims of 
that person’s creditors.”236 Trust law modifies these property 
rules by taking trust assets out of the reach of creditors and 
“thus appropriately can be said to involve property law.”237 
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A trust may be a contract. But a trust is also property. 
Trusts involve the keeping and care of assets, and trust law 
both builds on and modifies property law in regulating this spe-
cialized form of property ownership and management. 
b. Charitable Trusts Are a Special Property Type 
Charitable trusts and gifts are also types of property. 
Charitable giving is the transfer of property, and the gift itself 
is solicited, transferred, and ultimately managed as an institu-
tional asset. But charitable gifts are a special kind of property 
because they are exempt from the rule against perpetuities. 
Detailed gift conditions placed on endowed gifts therefore allow 
donors to control their contributions well past the end of their 
own lives.238 Charitable gifts are also subject to special tax 
rules. Since the introduction of the charitable deduction in 
1917, a donor has been allowed to deduct charitable contribu-
tions, subject to certain limitations.239 These charitable contri-
butions can be made either as trusts, as lifetime gifts, or be-
quests.240 A donor can deduct up to fifty percent of her annual 
adjusted gross income in charitable gifts and can also take car-
ryover gift deductions for five years.241 This includes gifts made 
as charitable trusts, for which donors can take a tax deduction 
at the time the trust is created.242 
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These exemptions and various forms of special treatment 
exist because charitable gifts are supposed to provide public 
benefit by funding the purposes stated in the charitable pur-
poses doctrine.243 In this way charitable gifts are intrinsically 
different from ordinary property. Addressing the question of 
tax treatment for charitable institutions, the Supreme Court in 
Bob Jones University v. United States stated: “[c]haritable ex-
emptions are justified on the basis that the exempt entity con-
fers a public benefit—a benefit which the society or the com-
munity may not itself choose or be able to provide, or which 
supplements and advances the work of public institutions al-
ready supported by tax revenues.”244 Charitable gifts are a 
form of property meant to provide specific benefits not just to 
an institution but also to the public. 
2. Property Doctrines of Necessity and Hardship 
Property rules focus heavily on questions about how to en-
able productivity, efficiency, and alienability with respect to 
property. In particular, the doctrines of necessity and variance 
have bearing on trust law because, with these doctrines, “[t]he 
focus is on use rather than ownership.”245 In this Section, I 
analyze in detail how easements by necessity and variances op-
erate. I also address how these doctrines solve problems of ne-
cessity and hardship and how these approaches have salience 
for trust law. 
a. Easements by Necessity: Learning from the Landlocked 
Easements by necessity are implied easements that arise 
“when there is no feasible way to enter or leave a property 
without trespassing on another person’s land.”246 The Restate-
ment (Third) of Property defines an easement by necessity as 
follows: “A conveyance that would otherwise deprive the land 
conveyed to the grantee, or land retained by the grantor, of 
rights necessary to reasonable enjoyment of the land implies 
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the creation of a servitude granting or reserving such rights.”247 
Similarly, the Restatement drafters noted: “Access rights are 
almost always necessary to the enjoyment of property. In a 
conveyance that would otherwise deprive the owner of access to 
property, access rights will always be implied.”248 
The common law rule can be traced back to the thirteenth 
century in England. A maxim dating from the time of Edward I 
(1239–1307) declared that “one who grants a thing must be un-
derstood to have granted that without which the thing could 
not be or exist.”249 A fourteenth-century English case held that 
a grantee was allowed to use a fishing net or other, similar de-
vice to take fish if there was a grant of the pond with the fish. 
The grantee could not, however, “cut a ditch and drain the pond 
for the purpose of getting the fish.”250 
The case and maxim both exemplify the theory of the 
easement by necessity, which is that property law presumes 
the intention of the parties is to convey benefit. Otherwise stat-
ed, “the law will not presume that was the intention of the par-
ties, that one should convey land to the other, in such a manner 
that the grantee could derive no benefit from the convey-
ance.”251 Later cases have also articulated a complementary 
public-policy rationale. In Buss v. Dyer, a case that turned on 
access to a chimney, the court, in declining to grant the ease-
ment, stated: “by a fiction of law, there is an implied reserva-
tion or grant to meet a special emergency, on grounds of public 
policy, as it has been said, in order that no land should be left 
inaccessible for purposes of cultivation.”252 Public policy favors 
the productive use of property.253 
Standards vary by state, but the general framework for 
easements by necessity requires that there must be unity of 
ownership of the entire tract prior to division, the necessity for 
easement must have existed at time of severance, and necessity 
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for the particular easement must be great.254 Within this 
framework, judicial inquiry focuses on what degree of necessity 
the grantee must experience and what the scope of the ease-
ment is.255 With respect to the degree of necessity, property 
standards are somewhat akin to contract impracticability and 
financial hardship standards and “the overwhelming majority 
of jurisdictions hold that an easement by necessity must be 
more than simply a matter of convenience.”256 For this reason, 
if the landowner has alternative access, even if the alternative 
is substantially less convenient, courts hesitate to grant the 
easements.257 
The test then becomes whether reasonable or strict neces-
sity exists for an easement. The majority rule is reasonable ne-
cessity, and “courts will normally consider the circumstances of 
both parties and then balance the needs of the claimant against 
the burden that will be placed on the servient estate.”258 This 
majority standard is based on the notion that property should 
be used productively and “to accomplish this goal, a court will 
lend its hand to establish a right of ingress and egress where 
none exists.”259 
Easements by necessity most frequently occur when a par-
cel of property is landlocked. Courts grant property owners 
easements so they can access their property, exit their proper-
ty, and—in the intervening time—put the property to produc-
tive use. As one scholar has said: “Because the doctrine of im-
plied easements is firmly rooted in public policy favoring the 
productive use of land, there are very few cases in which the 
owner of landlocked property has been denied an easement by 
necessity.”260 
For example, a recent Connecticut case turned on the ques-
tion of whether an easement by necessity could be created to 
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“provide commercial electricity to a parcel cut off from commer-
cial electricity.”261 
In 2001, the plaintiff and his neighbors had entered into an 
agreement with the defendant to improve an existing right-of-
way easement by installing a utility distribution system under 
it.262 The defendant charged each neighbor $7500 for use of the 
new utility easement, demanding in addition that the plaintiff 
pay not only the $7500 but also grant the defendant the “power 
to move the location of the easement at will.”263 After refusing 
the defendant’s terms, the plaintiff was cut off from access to 
commercial electricity. The plaintiff powered his house with a 
generator, but alleged that the generator did not provide ade-
quate power for “powering security devices, turning on auto-
matically in the event of a flood, and running a refrigerator to 
preserve perishable food without constant operation of the gen-
erator.”264 The trial court nevertheless granted summary 
judgment for the defendant, concluding that easements by ne-
cessity could not be created to provide utilities.265 
The appellate court disagreed. The appellate court admit-
ted that classic examples of easements by necessity involved a 
grantee’s inability to “use his property beneficially because he 
lacks physical access to it.”266 The same reasoning about pre-
sumed intent that operated in the classic examples, the court 
concluded, also could be extended to use of utilities: 
Utilities are so obviously necessary for the reasonable use and enjoy-
ment of all types of property that the law will assume that parties to 
a land conveyance intend to convey whatever is necessary to ensure a 
property’s access to utilities in the same way that the law presumes 
the parties intended to convey an easement for physical access.267 
The court mentioned that “because utilities are required 
for most reasonable uses of property, public policy dictates that 
access to utilities be implied to ensure ‘that no land should be 
left . . . incapable of being put to profitable use.’”268 The plain-
tiff was entitled to an easement by necessity. 
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As for the scope of the easement and the duration, the 
court concluded that the plaintiff had the right to use the 
easement “for all purposes consistent with the reasonable use 
of the benefited land.”269 The easement was not limited to 
“those purposes that existed at the time the benefited and bur-
dened properties were created.”270 Original conditions did not 
dictate present of future conditions. This conclusion followed, 
the court remarked, from the general rule that “the need con-
stituting the necessity that implies an easement by necessity 
may change over time.”271 Necessity, then, for the court was a 
changing measure requiring flexible judicial relief in order to 
ensure productive use of the property. 
The implications for trust law and cy pres are clear. Prop-
erty doctrine assumes that a grantor does not generally intend 
to give a gift that cannot be properly or effectively used. Fur-
thermore, public policy dictates that a grantee should not and 
need not be stuck with property that cannot be put to produc-
tive use. Property rules on policy emphasize efficient asset use, 
productive property, and grantee need. 
b. Looking to Variance: Zoned for Impracticability 
Variance is another means of exempting property from 
regulatory requirements—zoning ordinances, in this case—
when compliance would present undue hardship for the proper-
ty owner. Variances are, therefore, “referred to as a type of 
safety valve against overly intrusive land use regulation,” and 
they provide “a means for a landowner to obtain relief where 
hardship imposed on an individual parcel of land by a zoning 
ordinance outweighs the public benefit sought by the regula-
tion.”272 
Property owners may seek variance in a range of situa-
tions, most particularly when the property owner wishes to use 
her property in a way that is prohibited by applicable zoning 
laws.273 The key to a successful variance application is estab-
lishing that “an unnecessary or undue hardship would befall 
the land in question—and not the landowner personally—if the 
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letter of the zoning ordinance were strictly observed.”274 The 
result is that a “use variance gives a property owner permission 
to use the property in a manner inconsistent with a local zoning 
ordinance.”275 
Use-based zoning and variance laws emerged in the con-
text of Euclidian or single-use zoning, which was established as 
constitutional by Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. in 
1926.276 The variance ensured that zoning ordinances would 
“remain constitutional by building in a mechanism that would 
avoid imposing hardship on individual landowners.”277 Vari-
ance doctrine developed alongside questions of governmental 
takings and land-use regulation, and the variance helped to 
circumvent charges of regulatory takings. By 1939, in Otto v. 
Steinhilber, the New York Court of Appeals established a 
framework for evaluating the merits of a variance request that 
many jurisdictions have adopted.278 In Otto, the court stated 
that a zoning board could exercise discretion and grant a vari-
ance only: (1) if the property would not yield a reasonable re-
turn if used only as allowed by zoning ordinances; (2) if the 
hardship was due to unique circumstances and not to the gen-
eral conditions in the neighborhood; and (3) that the use to be 
authorized would not alter local conditions or any public benefit 
provided.279 
Unnecessary or undue hardship is therefore a key factor in 
granting variances. Also important, as highlighted by the Otto 
framework, is the notion of reasonable return. Courts will not, 
traditionally, grant a variance solely because of financial hard-
ship or profit loss. However, if an owner can show that “no rea-
sonable return is possible under permitted uses,”280 her vari-
ance request is more likely to be successful. Accordingly, 
variances, like easements by necessity, accentuate the efficient 
use of property and the right of a property owner to get value 
from her land. Variance doctrine also underscores that produc-
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tive use is a justification for modifying conditions of ownership 
and setting aside certain forms of regulatory control. Variance 
statutes differ somewhat by state, but the differences are mi-
nor. Virginia’s statute, for example, states: “[A] reasonable de-
viation [is granted] when the strict application of the ordinance 
would unreasonably restrict the utilization of the property, and 
such need for a variance would not be shared generally by other 
properties, and provided such variance is not contrary to the 
purpose of the ordinance.”281 
Judicial analysis of variance requests focuses accordingly 
on both the level of hardship and the concept of reasonable re-
turn.282 For example, in Nowicki v. Zoning Hearing Board, a 
2014 Pennsylvania case, the court evaluated whether a couple 
who had bought property for a family home experienced unnec-
essary hardship when the property was rezoned for commercial 
use before they could construct their residence.283 The question 
was whether this change in zoning denied the couple all eco-
nomically viable use of the property and created unnecessary 
hardship.284 
The background was this: two days before the couple exe-
cuted the sales agreement on the property in question, the bor-
ough enacted an ordinance that changed the zoning from resi-
dential to the Planned River-Oriented Development District 
(PROD) category. The stated goal was to “to take advantage of 
the views of the river, the recreational opportunities afforded 
by the river and the Pump Station, as well as the shopping and 
services available within walking distance in the business dis-
trict.”285 The couple had not yet begun construction on their 
planned residence when the zoning change passed, and they 
applied for a variance to build a single-family dwelling on the 
property.286 
At their hearing before the zoning board, eight neighbors 
who had residential dwellings in the rezoned area appeared in 
support of their request. Borough leaders also attended, howev-
er, and argued that the couple was not unnecessarily burdened 
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by the new restrictions because the new borough rules “permit-
ted the Property to be used for both noncommercial and public 
recreation.”287 The zoning board denied the request on the 
grounds the couple had failed to establish unnecessary hard-
ship.288 On appeal, the trial court reversed the zoning board 
and the case subsequently went to the state appellate court.289 
Addressing the question of value loss, the court remarked 
that financial loss or failure to profit alone were not sufficient 
grounds for a variance.290 On the other hand, the appellate 
court remarked, “an applicant seeking a use variance need not 
demonstrate that the property is rendered valueless as zoned in 
order to show that a variance is needed to make reasonable use 
of the property.”291 In the couple’s case, the court concluded, be-
cause the property was located within a residential portion of 
the PROD rezoned district, “it would be undesirable and ulti-
mately unmarketable for an economically viable recreation use, 
such as the golf practice facility or skating rink delineated in 
the Ordinance.”292 This lack of marketability of the property 
was sufficient to establish unnecessary hardship. 
In another variance case, from the Supreme Judicial Court 
of Maine in 2009, the court analyzed the question of hardship 
through a similar lens but used the reasonable-return frame-
work.293 That case, Wister v. Town of Mount Desert,294 turned 
on the right of a property owner to build a driveway that did 
not fit the zoning regulations. The proposed driveway was “not 
wide enough to accommodate the proposed fourteen-foot-wide 
driveway and allow a minimum five-foot setback on either side 
as required by the driveway setback provision.”295 The property 
owner applied to the zoning board for a variance in order to 
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 290. Id. at 293 (“Evidence that the zoned use is less financially profitable 
than the proposed use is insufficient to grant a variance.”). 
 291. Id. 
 292. Id. at 295. 
 293. “The ‘reasonable return’ element of the ‘unnecessary hardship’ stand-
ard may be interpreted as requiring proof by the applicant that the zoning re-
striction destroys or greatly diminishes the value of a specific piece of proper-
ty.” 131 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D 253, 306–07 (2013). 
 294. Wister v. Town of Mount Desert, 974 A.2d 903, 906 (Me. 2009). 
 295. Id. 
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construct this driveway, which would have helped provide ac-
cess to a second lot he owned that was landlocked.296 
The zoning board approved the variance, finding that a 
hardship existed because the property owner could not “get a 
reasonable return on the lots without a driveway.”297 The deci-
sion was appealed up to the state supreme court, where the 
court affirmed the board’s decision. The court agreed that “un-
due hardship” meant that “[t]he land in question can not yield 
a reasonable return unless a variance is granted.”298 Applying 
the rule to the facts, the state supreme court concluded: 
“[a]lthough Moore’s lots might have held some value without 
driveway access, given its proximity to a golf course and con-
servation lands, the [zoning board’s] determination that, with-
out a driveway allowing access to the lots, Moore will suffer the 
practical loss of all beneficial use of the lots is not clearly erro-
neous.”299 
Use variances, then, like easements by necessity, privilege 
the productive use of and a reasonable return on an asset. Var-
iances allow for flexibility within a regulatory system, and cre-
ate exemptions based on owner need. Variances provide a way 
for property owners to meet their needs when compliance with 
rules and restrictions is both costly and inefficient.  
III.  CRAFTING A CLEAR CY PRES STANDARD   
What should the trust law standard for impracticability 
look like? Both contract and property law are sufficiently simi-
lar to trust law in foundational ways such that their doctrines 
can and should help inform the cy pres standard. In this Part, I 
discuss exactly how contract and property rules can be used to 
clarify trust law and, subsequently, aid institutional fiduciaries 
as they confront recurring fiscal challenges. 
A. USING CONTRACT: REPURPOSING FINANCIAL HARDSHIP 
There is one clear lesson from the commercial impractica-
bility doctrine: financial hardship should be a standard criteri-
 
 296. Id. 
 297. Id. at 907. 
 298. Id. at 911–12. The other requirements were: “B. The need for a vari-
ance is due to the unique circumstances of the property and not to the general 
conditions in the neighborhood; C. The granting of a variance will not alter the 
essential character of the locality; and D. The hardship is not the result of ac-
tion taken by the applicant or a prior owner.” Id. 
 299. Id. at 912. 
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on for evaluating cy pres impracticability. Charitable institu-
tions confront financial problems for any number of reasons in-
cluding increases in costs over time, steep maintenance costs, 
and decreases in income—whether from investments or new 
gifts.300 Accordingly, court dockets contain cy pres requests 
from nonprofit institutions looking to gain flexibility in endow-
ment spending by loosening donor conditions placed on re-
stricted gifts. And the petitions that succeed, like the Corco-
ran’s, are from institutions on the brink of failure. 
For example, in In re Polytechnic University, a New York 
court granted cy pres relief allowing Polytechnic University to 
modify gift restrictions on a bequest in order to avoid institu-
tional failure.301 The donor had specified that the bequest was 
meant for a professorship, research fellowships, and building 
construction.302 However, as the court remarked, unforeseen 
circumstances—including the “the terrorist attacks on the 
World Trade Center and its effect on the local economy, com-
bined with the near meltdown of technological companies in 
2001”303—substantially diminished the university’s revenue. 
This drop in revenue forced the institution to fall below the li-
quidity covenant on some of its loans and below the “composite 
score requirements necessary for the University to participate 
in federal financial aid programs.”304 The court observed that 
the donor’s “charitable intentions [would] be frustrated if Poly-
technic University [were] forced to suspend operations.”305 
Consequently, the court concluded that removing the re-
strictions was the best approach, which allowed the university 
to reclassify the bequest as unrestricted income.306 
 
 300. Christian H. Brill, Art or Assets: University Museums and the Future 
of Deaccessioning, 28 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 61, 64 (2011) (“The decline in the 
stock market caused extreme drops in museum endowments. Wealthy donors 
chose to give to human services rather than the arts, and institutions were 
forced to reduce hours, cut staff, increase fees, or consider more drastic 
measures.”). For example, the New York Metropolitan Museum of Art’s en-
dowment shrank twenty-four percent from 2008 to 2009. See MET. MUSEUM OF 
ART, ANNUAL REPORT FOR THE YEAR 2008–2009, at 52 (2009). Meanwhile, the 
operating deficit increased from $1.9 million to $8.4 million from fiscal 2008 to 
fiscal 2009. Id. at 50. 
 301. In re Polytechnic Univ., 812 N.Y.S.2d 304, 311 (Sup. Ct. 2006). 
 302. Id. at 306. 
 303. Id. at 311. 
 304. Id. 
 305. Id. 
 306. Id. 
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Fisk University is another example of an institution that 
sought cy pres relief in the midst of financial distress. Fisk 
University, a historically black university founded in 1866, was 
the recipient of 101 paintings that were donated by Georgia 
O’Keeffe to the school in the late 1940s and early 1950s.307 The 
gift was conditioned on the requirement that the pieces could 
not be sold and that they all be displayed at Fisk University as 
one collection.308  
In 2005, in an attempt to remain financially solvent, the 
university sought permission to sell two valuable paintings.309 
It claimed that its “bleak financial circumstance”310 rendered it 
“‘impractical to comply with the literal terms’ of the gifts,”311 as 
did “other material changes in circumstances that have oc-
curred in the more than fifty years since the conditional gifts 
were made.”312 The complaint stated that the “purpose of the 
proposed sale was to generate funds for the University’s ‘busi-
ness plan’ to restore its endowment, improve its mathematics, 
biology, and business administration departments, and build a 
new science building.”313 
In concluding that the circumstances were impracticable, 
the trial court relied on the testimony of Fisk’s president, who 
“discussed the many cuts that had been implemented in an ef-
fort to reduce expenses, such as eliminating educational pro-
gramming for students, reducing the salary of faculty and staff, 
 
 307. Georgia O’Keeffe Found. v. Fisk Univ., 312 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. 2009). Four of the paintings were the property of Georgia O’Keeffe, and 
the rest O’Keeffe gave to the school from the Alfred Stieglitz collection, in her 
capacity as executrix of the estate. Id. 
 308. Id. 
 309. Id. While pending, the university’s request for relief morphed into a 
request for the approval of a proposed settlement agreement with the Crystal 
Bridges–Museum of American Art, Inc., “whereby the University would sell a 
50% undivided interest in the entire Collection for $30 million . . . . [and] the 
University and Crystal Bridges would each have the right to display the Col-
lection at their respective facilities six months of each year.” Id. at 5. 
 310. Id. at 15. 
 311. Id. 
 312. Id. 
 313. Id. at 4; see also Brill, supra note 300, at 65 (“[U]niversity museums 
serve two masters, answering to both museum and university boards. Because 
a university museum cannot act completely independently, it is more suscep-
tible to closure if its parent university decides that another priority—such as 
chemistry labs—would better fulfill its educational mission. This is made un-
mistakably clear by the fundamentally different missions of independent mu-
seums and university museums.”). 
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and mortgaging buildings on campus.”314 Asked whether Fisk 
was “viable” given the numerous financial challenges it faced, 
the president stated “No, not at all.”315 Accordingly, the trial 
court allowed Fisk to modify the gift terms.316 
These examples show that financial distress does some-
times obtain the desired result. Currently, however, because 
financial hardship is not explicitly recognized as a core compo-
nent of cy pres impracticability, judicial results are not predict-
able. Consequently, institutions that are unable to show imma-
nent insolvency, like Girard College and Sweet Briar, will not 
necessarily obtain cy pres relief. Moving forward, charitable in-
stitutions should be able to receive cy pres relief based upon the 
fiduciaries making a strong showing of unsustainable financial 
circumstances and recommending modifications. The fiduciar-
ies can and should be presumed to be acting in the best interest 
of the institution and using their discretion appropriately. 
Therefore, cy pres modification is appropriate under such cir-
cumstances, not only to give institutions additional operational 
latitude in crisis situations, but also to credit fiduciaries with 
the authority and discretion to perform their job. 
B. WHY A PROPERTY STANDARD IS BETTER 
If financial hardship is a key criterion, the next question is 
how to apply this standard of financial hardship. Not every 
case is as clear-cut a case of financial need as were the cases 
with Corcoran, Polytechnic University, or Fisk University, and 
institutions should not be forced to the point of closure in order 
to obtain cy pres relief. However, the same question that drives 
commercial impracticability emerges in cy pres analysis—how 
severe must the economic hardship be? The contract standard 
would ensure that very few nonprofit institutions receive cy 
pres relief. In this Section, I explain why the contract measure 
of hardship is conceptually inappropriate in the cy pres context, 
based on differences in bargaining and public benefit. 
1. Bequests, Not Bargains 
One reason that the trust law measure of hardship should 
be lower than the contract law one is that the parties to gift 
agreements do not necessarily bargain like ordinary contractu-
 
 314. In re Fisk Univ., 392 S.W.3d 582, 588 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011). 
 315. Id. Furthermore, O’Leary testified that the annual cost of $131,000 to 
maintain and display the collection was burdensome to the university. Id. 
 316. Id. at 591. 
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al bargaining partners. The high contract-law standard is 
based on the idea that the parties could and should have bar-
gained for protections. Excuse is therefore not available “in sit-
uations in which the impossibility results from the actions of 
one of the parties to the contract or where the promisor could 
have relatively easily taken actions to avoid the failure of the 
underlying condition.”317 Bargaining is a central part of the 
contractual relationship. 
In charitable giving, bargaining plays a different and more 
peripheral role. While the donor or the donor’s family is alive, 
there is sometimes bargaining, to be sure. And for some major 
gifts, there is even substantial bargaining. Gifts negotiations 
can center, for example, on the amount of control retained by 
the donors. When Lee Bass gave Yale University twenty mil-
lion dollars in 1991, “[i]t was an unusual gift . . . because of the 
specificity of its academic purpose.”318 The gift was meant to 
support the study of Western Civilization by creating seven en-
dowed faculty positions for senior faculty and four new junior 
faculty positions.319 Four years after the gift was announced, 
however, Yale returned the money, stating that the parties 
could not negotiate acceptable terms for use of the gift.320 The 
gift, and its ultimate return, came to represent for some “the 
hazards of accepting gifts with special conditions”321 as well as 
a failure of negotiation.322 
Donor recognition is similarly a subject of negotiation. 
When Edith and Henry Everett made a multimillion dollar 
 
 317. Paul L. Joskow, Commercial Impossibility, the Uranium Market and 
the Westinghouse Case, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 119, 154–55 (1977). 
 318. Jennifer Kaylin, Bass, Yale, and Western Civ., YALE ALUMNI MAG. 
(Summer 1995), http://archives.yalealumnimagazine.com/issues/95_07/bass 
.html. 
 319. Id. 
 320. Id.; see also Jacques Steinberg, Yale Returns $20 Million to an Un-
happy Patron, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 1995), http://www.nytimes.com/1995/03/ 
15/us/yale-returns-20-million-to-an-unhappy-patron.html (“To the best of my 
knowledge, this is the largest gift that has ever been returned by an institu-
tion to a donor.”). 
 321. Kaylin, supra note 318. 
 322. Despite this cautionary tale, bargaining between institutions and do-
nors over program control has continued. Controversy has, for example, 
emerged over the desire of the Koch brothers to select faculty for the chairs 
they endow based on political and philosophical preferences. Alex Pareene, 
Right-Wing Billionaires Purchasing Own Professors, SALON (May 12, 2011), 
http://www.salon.com/2011/05/12/buying_professors_kochs; Kris Hundley, Bil-
lionaire’s Role in Hiring Decisions at Florida State University, TAMPA BAY 
TIMES (May 10, 2011). 
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pledge in 1996 to support the renovation of the Children’s Zoo 
in Central Park, they bargained with the Wildlife Conservation 
Society (WCS), the group overseeing the renovation. The Ever-
etts wanted their name engraved in the stone archway at the 
entrance to the zoo, erasing the name of the original donors. 
The Everetts proposed replacing the engraving of the original 
donors’ family name with small recognition plaques on either 
side of the archway. The New York City Art Commission re-
jected this proposal and the Everetts withdrew their gift.323 
Once the gift has been paid in full or the trust created, 
however, there is little legal opportunity for renegotiation. Af-
ter the execution of the gift instrument, the assets are in care of 
the institution and, under traditional law, the donor no longer 
has standing, nor do her descendants.324 An institution may of 
course return to a donor, while she is still living, or the donor’s 
family, and ask permission to redirect funds or redraft the gift 
terms. This was what Sweet Briar did in anticipation of closing 
the college doors. Institutions engage in this type of outreach 
even when they are not legally obligated to do so for public re-
lations reasons and because of stewardship best practices. Bar-
gaining once the gift has been completed is not, however, the 
norm in charitable giving. 
Moreover, many times there is no bargaining at all. In the 
cases of the Corcoran or the Barnes Trust, the donors created 
stand-alone institutions through testamentary trusts and there 
were no other parties to check, counter, or decline the terms of 
the trusts. John Langbein says of these situations: “the deal is 
of the take-it-or-leave-it type, like the movie-theater ticket or 
the vending-machine contract; there is no negotiating terms 
with a decedent.”325 
Likewise, donors may create a testamentary trust or leave 
a bequest to an already existing institution without giving any 
notice to the institution. Donors have no obligation to bargain 
or even notify an institution, and the norm historically has 
been to create trusts or give gifts without much back and forth 
 
 323. The New York Times reported the retraction of the pledge. David W. 
Dunlap, $3 Million Zoo Gift Revoked Because Plaque Is Too Small, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 15, 1997), http://www.nytimes.com/1997/05/15/nyregion/3-million-zoo-gift 
-revoked-because-plaque-is-too-small.html. 
 324. See Brody, supra note 27, at 1187 (“The reason for disabling the donor 
might be to recognize the completeness of the gift for public purposes.”). The 
UTC, however, has been revised and now allows for settlor standing. UNIF. 
TRUST CODE § 405 (c) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010). 
 325. Langbein, supra note 17, at 637. 
 1842 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:1789 
 
between donor and institution. For this reason, a number of in-
stitutions have implemented donor recognition societies for 
those who plan their giving as a bequest in order to encourage 
early communication about the gift.326 
Bargaining plays a different role in charitable giving than 
it does in commercial contract law.327 Bargaining happens, to 
be sure. Nevertheless, it is not usually the robust bargaining 
imagined by contract law. And sometimes there is no bargain-
ing at all. Consequently, presumptions about bargaining—and 
standards based on these presumptions—should be recalibrat-
ed. 
2. Public Benefit, Not Private Desire 
Another factor that works in favor of a lower impracticabil-
ity measure is the public benefit intervention. Nonprofit insti-
tutions must provide public benefit and contribute to the public 
good, as mandated by the charitable purposes doctrine and tax 
rules.328 Donors are similarly circumscribed by the charitable 
purposes doctrine in that their gifts must go to support these 
same institutional objectives in order to receive tax deductions. 
In other words, charitable giving is charitable because of the 
public purpose it serves. 
There is, therefore, a third party to the gift giving whose 
benefit should be considered in the cy pres calculus—the pub-
lic.329 A charitable gift’s impracticability does not impact the 
donor and institution alone; it also impacts the various publics 
 
 326. Stanford, for example, clearly states on its planned giving website: “If 
you let Stanford know about your intended bequest or other planned gift, you 
will be invited to enjoy special events and recognition as a member of the 
Founding Grant Society.” Planned Giving, STANFORD UNIV., http://giving 
.stanford.edu/planned-giving/overview/founding-grant-society (last visited Apr. 
12, 2018). Columbia says: “Once you complete your estate plan, please let us 
know. Columbia would like to thank you for your generosity by including you 
in the 1754 Society.” Ways To Give: Planned Giving, COLUMBIA UNIV., http:// 
columbia.giftplans.org/index.php?cID=111&msect=1&create=1&mID=19 (last 
visited Apr. 12, 2018). 
 327. See Brody, supra note 27, at 1258 (“[A]lthough a restricted gift consti-
tutes an agreement between the donor and the charity, it is not merely a con-
tract in the private law sense—rather, an unascertainable group constitutes 
the true beneficiaries.”). 
 328. The IRS defines exempt or charitable purposes in Exempt Purposes—
Internal Revenue Code Section 501(c)(3), IRS (June 30, 2017), https://www.irs 
.gov/charities-non-profits/charitable-organizations/exempt-purposes-internal 
-revenue-code-section-501-c-3. 
 329. See Susan N. Gary, Restricted Charitable Gifts: Public Benefit, Public 
Voice 21–24 (on file with author). 
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who benefit from the gift and who are not party to any bargain-
ing or negotiations around the terms of the gift. Accordingly, 
public benefit should factor into cy pres considerations and any 
increase or decrease to the public benefit should have a weight 
equivalent to that placed on donor wishes. Public benefit is, of 
course, not always easy to measure, and the relevant publics 
can be many—with conflicting needs.330 Nevertheless, the pub-
lic has a continuing interest in receiving the benefit intended 
by the gift, equal to or possibly greater than the donor’s inter-
est in restricting gift usage.331 
In Kolb v. City of Storm Lake, for example, the Iowa Su-
preme Court concluded that the terms of a gift to the city were 
impracticable, allowing the city to override the donor conditions 
to better serve “societal needs.”332 The donor had left a bequest 
funding the creation and maintenance of a garden and fountain 
in the center of the city. Years later, the city developed “plans 
for an economic revitalization project.”333 The project was in-
tended to “provide a new public beach, a lighthouse, a family 
playground, a lodge, and an indoor/outdoor water park.”334 
Critical to the project’s implementation, however, was the relo-
cation of the gardens and fountain in a different city park. The 
court remarked:  
Such a massive project should be planned in a way that maximizes its 
potential, and when the location of the garden and fountain jeopard-
ize that potential it becomes impractical not to relocate them. As a re-
sult, we think it would be impracticable to fund the garden at its orig-
inal location.335  
Public benefit prevailed and the outcome underscored the im-
portance of this third-party beneficiary to the gift “contract.” 
Public benefit is a condition of the gift, a primary point of 
charitable giving, and a predicate to the functioning of the non-
profit sector. This benefit should not be constrained because of 
outdated or inefficient donor conditions. Put differently, cy pres 
impracticability should not be so difficult a standard to reach 
as to preclude the provisioning of public benefit. 
 
 330. See Tait, Publicity Rules for Public Trusts, supra note 68, at 421. 
 331. Moreover, donors have already received multiple benefits, financial 
and other, from their donations. They have received benefits, and so should 
the relevant public. See Tait, The Secret Economy of Charitable Giving, supra 
note 2, at 1667. 
 332. Kolb v. City of Storm Lake, 736 N.W.2d 546, 558 (Iowa 2007). 
 333. Id. at 551. 
 334. Id. 
 335. Id. at 557. 
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C. USING PROPERTY: PRODUCTIVE USE AND REASONABLE 
RETURN  
Property rules offer a model for crafting an appropriate 
measure for cy pres hardship. Property rules focus, like con-
tract rules, on hardship and necessity, but property rules are 
conceptually grounded in notions of productive property use 
and reasonable return. These are concepts that transfer easily 
into the cy pres context. To be sure, an institution can prove fi-
nancial hardship through financial statements, budgeting 
plans, and annual audits, as happened in the Fisk University 
and Corcoran cases. Institutions should also, however, be able 
to obtain cy pres relief by demonstrating that a restricted fund 
is sitting unused or rarely used when the funds could be put to 
more effective use.336 
For example, if a university fund dedicated to bringing in 
visiting lecturers in a particularly narrow field is rarely used 
because of the limiting conditions, an institution should be able 
to expand the scope—perhaps to funding research more gener-
ally in the chosen field—thereby gaining more budgeting flexi-
bility. An underutilized gift clearly contravenes the notion of 
productive use and reasonable return. Likewise, an endowed 
fund at a university that is restricted to providing scholarship 
money to students from a particular, limited geographic region 
and is rarely awarded could be modified in order to expand the 
region and capture more students. Possible examples abound, 
but the lesson is the same: expanding the scope of permissible 
spending may help put the gift to productive use. Accordingly, 
when an institution can demonstrate that a certain restricted 
fund has not been used or used only very infrequently for a sus-
tained length of time, then cy pres modifications should be 
available in order to put the gift to productive use and obtain a 
reasonable return. 
In addition to measuring the use—or disuse—of a gift, the 
concepts of productive use and reasonable return can be repur-
posed to apply when nonprofit institutions are not able to spend 
gift funds in such a way as to create public benefit. A situation 
involving “unreasonable” return might therefore occur when a 
 
 336. UPMIFA allows nonprofit institutions to modify restricted funds with 
a value of $25,000 or less that are over twenty years old without obtaining ju-
dicial approval. The institution must only notify the state attorney general. 
UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INST. FUNDS ACT § 6 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2006), 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/prudent%20mgt%20of%20 
institutional%20funds/upmifa_final_06.pdf. 
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gift that is restricted to a certain spending priority—a particu-
lar center or program that, while it still exists, no longer re-
quires the same level of funding that it once did because it has 
decreased its activities. Obtaining a reasonable return of the 
gift might therefore require modifying the spending conditions 
such that the scope, as well as the public benefit, could be ex-
panded. The concept of reasonable return could be defined in 
various ways in order to be useful in the cy pres context. What 
is important is that institutions have the opportunity to 
demonstrate why they are not getting a “reasonable return” on 
the gift because of its restrictions and how they could improve 
the return by slightly modifying the gift terms while still fund-
ing a similar project, department, or initiative. 
In all of the scenarios above, institutions would not have to 
prove financial insolvency or desperation. Instead, they could 
obtain cy pres relief through a showing of how the restricted 
funds are not being used at all, not being used productively, or 
not being used to the institution’s reasonable advantage. This 
would allow public charities to use more of their restricted gifts 
fund, obtain increased flexibility in their financial operations, 
and deter the problem of donor governance. 
  CONCLUSION   
Currently, the vagaries of an unclear cy pres standard are 
harming public charities, binding the fiduciaries in their gov-
ernance role and impairing budgetary flexibility by leaving 
outdated donor restrictions in place. The problem is that trust 
law, in search of a consistent cy pres standard, is caught be-
tween two competing, conceptual goals: keeping promises and 
meeting needs. The question for trust law is which path to fol-
low. Trust law shares historical connections as well as concep-
tual underpinnings with both contract and property law, mak-
ing them fitting lenses through which to examine and clarify 
the contours of cy pres impracticability. Contract and trust law 
share not only doctrinal architecture but also a particular theo-
retical mandate—promises must be kept. Property and trust 
law share a deep conceptual foundation relating to asset man-
agement and productive property use. How, then, should trust 
law navigate between these two poles? I propose that trust law 
should use the contract criterion of financial hardship coupled 
with a property measure of hardship, focusing on productive 
use and reasonable return. This hybrid standard reflects the 
dual nature of trust law, shedding light on how trust law is a 
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composite of both contract and property. This standard is also 
appropriate given the distinctive design and demands of chari-
table institutions. Ultimately, using contract and property to 
build a stronger and more consistent cy pres standard not only 
reveals trust law’s multifaceted nature but also the proper ap-
proach to regulating charitable giving in a modern landscape of 
both promise and need. 
